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THE POLITICS OF PLANNING FOR URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES IN THE
MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC LAW
SHELDON J. PLAGER* and JOEL F. HANDLER**
In this article Professors Plager and Handler examine the
influence of legal process upon decision making in munici-
pal redevelopment. Their thesis is that public acceptance
of a redevelopment venture depends primarily on the com-
mand of political and planning skills and occurs despite
rather than because of legal procedures designed to ac-
commodate principles of democracy. Partly through the
method of a case study of recent data collected from one
municipality, partly by comparative analysis with other
studies, they conclude that the reality of decision making
in the region they explore is the predominance of informal
power over formal, democratic, legal decision-making
devices.
INTRODUCTION
In May 1961 at the city council meeting of Center City, the mayor
announced that a multimillion dollar, nine-square-block urban re-
development project would be built, creating a new retail shopping
complex in the heart of the downtown section, one block from the
main business street. Center Circle-our name for the project-
will profoundly affect the people of that community. To undertake
the project, for a community the size of Center City, involved a
political decision of the first magnitude. It involved a major re-
allocation of a scarce commodity-land in the heart of the central
business district; a multimillion dollar investment by the private
promoters; a previously undreamed of commitment of local public
resources including capital improvements in the form of parking
facilities, road improvements, and utility relocations; and a program
of related public controls in the form of protective zoning. It in-
volved a major economic shift away from the existing Main Street
merchants to the promoters and developers of the project and
their tenants. Streets had to be vacated, traffic patterns changed,
people and businesses moved. Center Circle will affect where
people will shop, how they will get to and from work, where they
will live, and what type of growth and development they will have
in their community.
The purpose of this study is to examine how projects such as
Center Circle come about. Our concern is with the relationships
and interactions of politics, planning, and the legal processes that
are involved in urban redevelopment efforts. Since the pattern in
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B., University of North
Carolina, 1952; LL.B., University of Florida, 1958; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity, 1961.
** Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A.B., Princeton Univer-
sity, 1954; LL.B., Harvard University, 1957.
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any one community has limited value, we will after detailing the
Center City experience compare it with similar efforts described
in four recently published studies: Harold Kaplan's study of slum
clearance in Newark, New Jersey;' Robert A. Dahl's examination
of the New Haven Redevelopment Agency; 2 Rossi and Dentler's
account of the Hyde Park-Kenwood project; 3 and Meyerson and
Banfield's study of public housing in Chicago.4 These projects
have in common the fact that they were significant political deci-
sions-decisions which are required to be made in accordance with
legally prescribed procedures.
The legal process attempts to structure the decision-making proc-
ess so that decisions will be consistent with public goals. The
people of the community decide, through their official representa-
tives, the basic pattern of development of the community-the
comprehensive plan, the zoning ordinance, the subdivision regula-
tions, and the building codes. If change is to be made, it is sub-
mitted first to those who specialize in this aspect of public decision
making: the plan commission and the planners. This unit of gov-
ernment hears, considers, and then recommends to the elected rep-
resentatives of the people, the city council. The council, after
due notice and hearing, decides what is best for the community.
Other units of government which may be affected (such as agen-
cies concerned with parking, streets and traffic, utilities, and
schools) are also consulted. If these units of government are au-
tonomous, and if their services are needed, then their consent
must also be obtained.
The legally prescribed procedures for public decision making re-
flect a democratic value: those to be affected by the decision are to
be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard-the merchants, the
site residents, the taxpayers, and the other interested people and
groups. This does not necessarily mean that those affected will
control the shape of the redevelopment program. In decisions of
this type, some will gain and some will lose. But the process does
contemplate that the legally authorized decision maker (the city
council) will at least consider the competing interests. This is of
benefit to the decision maker, since those who are directly affected
presumably know the most about their particular problems. The
required use of the local planning bodies and their decision-making
procedures also reflects this democratic value. And the planning
bodies, in theory at least, perform the additional function of pro-
viding the council with disinterested expert help.
Public participation and the assertion and consideration of af-
fected interests-as required by law and democratic ideals-place
1 KAPLAN, URBAN RENEWAL POLITICS (1963).
2 DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961).
3 Rossi & DENTLER, THE POLITICS OF URBAN RENEWAL (1961).
4 MEYERSON & BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(paperback ed. 1964).
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the promoters in something of a dilemma. The legally prescribed
methods of public decision making give the various affected inter-
ests not only the opportunity to be heard, but also the opportunity
to defeat the project; they can persuade the local legislature to
deny the necessary support. The procedures cannot be ignored by
the promoters. At some point the project has to be brought to the
surface and be submitted to the formal process of governmental
decision making.
The outcome of the struggle at the public level and the integrity
of the decision-making process itself will depend on how well the
competing interests use the relevant resources available to them.
There are two resources of particular importance. The first we
call political skills. The proponents of the project have to gain the
explicit consent of the governmental decision makers-the council
and the plan commission. Their goal is to gain official planning
and legislative support without running the risks of deliberative
debate. The strategy is to enter the public arena when the poten-
tial opposition is still uninformed and unorganized and then
proceed through the decision-making steps before the opposition
can make itself felt. Success requires secrecy during the formative
stages of the plan and co-operation from those public officials who
are both powerful and sympathetic. When the plan is made public,
the public machinery must move promptly and swiftly, before the
opposition can acquire its own political skills.
But political skills are not enough for significant land-use plan-
ning issues. Another resource has to be used. We call this planning
skills. Proposals for redevelopment projects (as well as counter-
proposals) appear largely in technical form: statistical tables,
charts, graphs, reports, maps, and drawings. The technical para-
phenalia serve several vital tactical functions. They give an air of
scientific neutrality to the proposal by masking the very important
value decisions. What is the "best use" of urban land? How much
and what kinds of benefits can the community realize from the
project? Are these benefits worth the cost? Land-use planning
decisions of this scope involve judgments about values and prob-
abilities. The decisions are political in the broadest sense. They
are not susceptible of final determination by technical experts or
by scientific, "objective" "facts."5 The technical data then tend "to
conceal what is really at issue and to direct the discussion along the
lines that are either irrelevant or less than fully relevant."6 They
also help neutralize the opposition. The technical justification for
the proposal is prepared and supported by experts in land use, traf-
fic, municipal financing, and marketing. If the proposal is to be
evaluated and countered successfully, then the opposition (includ-
ing uncommitted governmental officials) must also use experts.
5 BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE 283 (1965 ed.).
6 Ibid.
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Simply saying "No" or "I don't like it" is not enough. Opponents
in the public arena need planning skills as well as political skills,
even though basically political issues are to be decided.
Our thesis is that the success (in terms of community acceptance)
of the redevelopment proposal depends primarily on whether the
proponents or the opponents command the political and planning
skills. The locus of the actual decision-making power (the ability to
prevail in the redevelopment effort) will be determined by which
of the various groups have both these skills. Neither skill without
the other is sufficient. And the degree of monopoly of these skills
will determine both the substantive results of the redevelopment
decisions and the genuineness of the use of the legally required
public decision-making apparatus. In other words, despite the goals
and purposes of the legally established decision-making procedures,
the integrity of that process and the rationality of planning in the
public interest depend on the realities of the power relationships of
the actors in the process. This is true even though the promoters
are required to use the public law process and the public decision
makers have veto power over the projects.
In the first part of this article we will detail the Center City ex-
perience. We will examine closely the range of substantive politi-
cal questions which faced the community, the full extent of public
contributions and support required for the project, and, as a foun-
dation for our thesis, how the public decisions were made. In the
second part we will test the thesis by examining the results
of the previously cited studies by others of the redevelopment pro-
jects in Newark, New Haven, and the two in Chicago.
I. CENTER CITY
Center City is located in the central part of a midwestern state.
From 1830 to 1870 the city showed consistent economic develop-
ment. It was during this period that its three-block Main Street
was established to serve the needs of the surrounding growing ag-
ricultural community. In the course of the next ninety years the
population of the city expanded from 3,800 to 28,500. The area in
general grew strong commercially and in population. The state
university, located in Center City, increased from a few hundred
students to a student population of over 25,000 and a staff popula-
tion of 10,000. In 1960 the population of Central County, of which
Center City is the county seat, was 132,000.
However, during this period of growth the adjacent city of Lees-
berg got the railroad depot, the industrial and commercial develop-
ment, and the lion's share of the population. The major part of
the economic development of the 1940's and 1950's passed Center
City by. It was estimated that only between ten and twenty per
cent of the retail business in the area was done on Center City's
Main Street, with most of the Center City shoppers adjusted to the
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idea of traveling the extra twenty or thirty blocks to the downtown
area in Leesberg. As a result, despite Center City's rise in popu-
lation, there was an actual one-third decline in the number of busi-
ness establishments in the town.
Whatever the reason for the economic stagnation and apathetic
atmosphere of Center City, several political, civic, and business
leaders felt that unless something was done, Center City was going
to suffer an economic death. The first attempt to do something
about the situation followed the traditional pattern-the problems
would be solved if a suitable manufacturing plant would locate in
the city. Aside from the injection of needed tax revenues into the
municipal coffers and the stimulus to retail business from the
plant employees, it was hoped by some that a large plant would
furnish vigorous business leaders who would help prod the com-
munity into taking further action to stimulate the economic growth
of the city. In part, the plan worked. A coalition of city officials
and businessmen was able to persuade a large manufacturing
plant to locate in Center City. But the long-range hopes of the
farsighted few were not realized. The imported leaders connected
with the plant were interested in public relations, not in rocking the
boat. The over-all failure of this plan forced the activists in the
community to seek other solutions.
The next plan of action was to persuade a large department
store to come to Center City, which, it was thought, would bring
Main Street back to life. In 1959 the mayor appointed a twenty-
four-man economic council to explore this avenue. At the time a
national retail chain had a small store in Center City. The
primary purpose of the new economic council was to persuade the
chain to expand its Center City store. The activists formed a
small subcommittee. Preliminary negotiations seemed promising,
but when the two strongest members of the subcommittee-X, a
lawyer, and Y, a merchant-went to the head office in New York
City, they arrived only to be advised that the chain had just decided
to build a modern store in Leesberg. Center City's offer of a "good
community" was not good enough.
A. Center Circle-The Early Stages
The defeat suffered at the hands of the national chain only
served to stimulate X and Y into redoubling their efforts. They
were still of the view that a single large department store would
best meet Center City's needs. Another major retail chain was con-
tacted. This chain was not interested in the conventional shopping
center located on the periphery of the city where it would be vul-
nerable to future competition. It was definitely interested in
forming a complex of stores, of which it would be the hub, in the
central business district of the city; but additional economic in-
formation would be needed before the chain could decide about
Center City.
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Economic studies cost money and it was at this point that the
activists separated from those in the community who paid only lip
service to the problems of Center City. X and Y, as part of the
subcommittee, were still theoretically representing the city gov-
ernment. But the city council was not prepared to lend financial
support to study the feasibility of a private venture, particularly if
the venture might alienate conservative segments in the commun-
ity. The two activists turned to the local chamber of commerce,
which up to this time had mainly devoted its efforts to placating
the local businessmen with dollar days and street sales. A few of
the leaders of the chamber, on its behalf, agreed to share equally
with the chain the 10,000 dollar cost of an economic study.
A consumer analysis firm in New York City was hired and the
results of the study were satisfactory to the chain. During the
summer of 1960 the chain made its decision to locate in Center City
and the site was selected. Further plans were laid during that fall
and winter. In the spring of 1961 the planning of the Center
Circle development was sufficiently ready for official announce-
ment to the people of Center City.
B. Implementing Center Circle: The Timetable of the Public
Decisions
The City Council meeting of May 15, 1961, opened with the
usual routine matters--reports of the standing committees, ap-
proval of contractors' bonds, and the unanimous approval of an
ordinance dealing with the location of fire hydrants. Then the
city attorney presented and read a resolution entitled "Resolution
in Reference to Vacation of Portions of Several Streets and Alleys
in Downtown Center City and in Regard to Additional Off-Street
Parking for Center City and Related Matters."
The Center Circle development was now officially before the city
council. In the "whereas" clauses of the resolution, it was stated
that "a plan exists to provide [an] additional business district with-
in a certain area of the downtown central business district and for
further renewal and redevelopment of the downtown central busi-
ness district area with certain boundaries as provided by such
plan." The resolution went on to read that "an engineering, eco-
nomic and development plan is in existence" and that "pursuant to
such plans . . . additional municipal off-street parking facilities
appear to be needed, . . . additional revenue bonds will become
necessary," and "certain amendments may be necessary to the Zon-
ing Ordinance . . . to implement such a plan." It was therefore
resolved that the council on behalf of the city "declare that this
resolution and the provisions and proposed accomplishments are
towards the best interests of the City" and the council "further
declares the intention to accomplish the aims and construction for
the plans [sic] for such redevelopment of the downtown central
business district." The resolution authorized the city's parking
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commission to engage engineers and attorneys to prepare an issu-
ance of revenue bonds to provide money for the construction of
parking facilities and authorized the city plan commission "to
amend the Zoning Ordinances . . to facilitate the implementation
of the above plan and redevelopment."
The city attorney explained that the issuance of revenue bonds
would entail no obligation on the local taxpayers. An official
from the chamber of commerce gave what was called in the news-
papers a "short account" of the history of the project and stated
that it was the result of eighteen months of study and planning by
a group of Center City businessmen, civic leaders, and elected pub-
lic officials. With that, it was moved and seconded that the resolu-
tion be "enthusiastically adopted." The motion carried unani-
mously.
The city council was now publicly on record in support of the
project; it had publicly committed itself to do its part to aid the
"plan." Activity then shifted to the plan commission. During the
week after the council action, the plan commission held two in-
formal (i.e., executive) meetings in the mayor's office to discuss
the zoning changes that were requested by the promoters. The
promoters wanted a block-wide belt of noncommercial zoning
around the shopping center complex, on the east, south, and west.
On May 25 notice of public hearings on a proposed new classifica-
tion-RM-Multiple-Family Residential-was published. On June 9
the plan commission held the public hearing, which was well at-
tended. One of the commissioners explained the history and plans
of the shopping center, the studies that had been made, and the ex-
pected benefits to the community. He also emphasized the fact that
the city council had already committed itself to the project. Repre-
sentatives of the promoters' planners and consultants also spoke.
The meeting was then adjourned to June 14. On that day the
new classification, with a few changes, was unanimously adopted.
The commission directed the city attorney (who was also the sec-
retary of the plan commission) to draft an ordinance applying the
new classification to the designated area.
On June 19 the action shifted back to the city council. The plan
commission presented its recommendation that the new amendment
to the zoning ordinance and the ordinance applying the classifica-
tion be adopted. There was no discussion and both measures passed
unanimously.
This action, thirty-five days after the project was announced,
completed the city's obligation with regard to zoning changes. The
council then began to implement its obligation to provide off-street
parking, as stated in the May 15 "resolution of intent." As will be
explained later, the promoters had most of the land in the project
site under option to purchase. The promoters wanted the city to
buy from them a substantial part of this land to be used for mu-
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nicipal parking lots for the project. At this meeting the council,
by motion, authorized the parking commission and the city attor-
ney, as a committee, to approve the terms of the options for the
parking-lot land, and "requested" the promoters to exercise the ap-
proved options and convey the land to the city at the promoters'
cost. In October 1962 an engineering firm was hired to prepare a
feasibility study for the parking revenue bonds. In February 1963
the city vacated the streets and alleys traversing the project site.
On June 10, 1963, the plan commission approved the feasibility
study for the revenue bonds; and four days later the council au-
thorized the mayor to enter into formal contracts with the promot-
ers for the purchase of the parking-lot land, and the same day ap-
proved the ordinance for the issuance of 3,200,000 dollars worth
of revenue bonds. On June 28, 1963, the city purchased the land
from the promoters at a cost of 1,642,000 dollars. The Center Circle
development was opened for business in the late summer of 1964.
This is the public record of Center Circle. The timetable of offi-
cial decisions does not reveal too much of what the "plan" was
about. But it does show quite clearly that the Center City gov-
ernment was perfectly satisfied in its own collective mind that its
initial decision endorsing the "plan" was correct. After the "resolu-
tion of intent" on May 15, 1961, the implementing public deci-
sions moved smoothly and quickly. The city fathers never
wavered from their initial judgment that the "plan" was good for
the people of Center City.
What was this "plan" that commanded such unanimous respect
and agreement?
C. Center Circle--"Planning in the Public Interest"
Center Circle, like other 'urban redevelopment projects, involved
many familiar downtown planning issues: the allocation of land
uses within the project site; the impact on developing land uses in
the areas adjacent to the project; traffic circulation which includes
patterns of movement through and around the central business
district as well as into and out of the district; and the perennial
problem of downtown parking.
The city had available most of the traditional tools for dealing
with these questions. A municipal plan commission had been in
existence since 1945. The commission membership consisted of the
mayor, the president of the board of local improvements, the
commissioner of public works, the chairman of the zoning board
of appeals, and six citizens chosen by the mayor with the approval
of the city council. No paid technical staff was provided, although
subsequently one of the city attorney's jobs was to serve as secre-
tary to the commission.
About 1948 a community plan committee was formed for the pur-
pose of promoting the preparation of a comprehensive plan for the
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Leesberg-Center City area. The program was financed through
public subscription and from appropriations by ten local taxing
bodies as well as the state university. A city planning firm was
employed, and in June 1950 its study, entitled Comprehensive De-
velopment Plan for Leesberg-Center City, was released. The study
contained detailed recommendations concerning the future develop-
ment of the Center City business district, and proposals for traffic
circulation patterns in and around the district.
In November 1950 the Center City City Council adopted a com-
prehensive zoning ordinance and map for the city. This ordinance
and map, as revised from time to time, has been in effect since
that date. Ten years later, in August 1960, a nationally known
planning firm completed for the State Division of Highways a study
entitled A Major Street and Highway Plan for the Leesberg-Center
City Urban Area. This study included a long-range plan for the
traffic circulation system in the Center City central business dis-
trict.
The city, then, had some experience with professional planning
and had available to it independent professional studies concerning
the over-all growth and development of the community. One of the
striking aspects of the planning for Center Circle is that despite the
fact that the proposed project would drastically affect the future
growth and development of the entire downtown area, and would
commit a substantial segment of the community's iesources to a
particular pattern of uses, the city not only chose not to conduct
any new independent planning studies, but also apparently ig-
nored those independent studies available to it. The basic econom-
ic, engineering, and planning studies for the project were done by
two large consulting firms hired by the promoters of the project.
A summary of their findings in support of the project was released
in a report entitled Downtown Center City-Project Summary,
dated May 1961. The report gave no indication that these inde-
pendent professional studies were utilized during its preparation.
Further, there is no evidence that the plan commission as a group
was aware of the proposal, officially or otherwise, until the "in-
formal" meeting of the commission in the mayor's office on May 22,
1961, one week after the city council had publicly gone on record in
favor of "the plan"; "the plan" could be none other than the pro-
moters' Project Summary. Nor is there evidence that the plan
commission took into consideration any of the earlier independent
studies during the period that it considered and recommended ap-
proval of the Center Circle project. If they had, they would have
seen that "the plan" outlined in the Project Summary, when com-
pared with the detailed recommendations of the earlier studies, re-
vealed areas of direct conflict.
1. TRAFFIC
The principal traffic problem was one of convenient circulation
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east and west through downtown Center City. The downtown
area was composed essentially of three parts. The principal busi-
ness district centered around a two-block stretch of stores on Main
Street, running east and west. Main Street, a few blocks west of the
two-block stretch, angled into First Avenue, another east-west
street which then narrowed and curved west. To the north of the
two-block stretch for about five blocks was an area of mixed com-
mercial and light industrial uses. The area was generally poorly
developed and somewhat run down. It was bounded on the north
by Audrey Avenue, running east and west. South of the Main
Street shopping area for two or three blocks was an area of mixed
commercial and public uses-courthouse, post office, city hall, ho-
tel, church, funeral parlor-and further southward was a residen-
tial section, with multiple family uses shading into single family.
Running east and west through this area, and two blocks south of
Main Street, was Indiana Street, the major east-west street through
central Center City, providing direct access to the western part of
the city, to the university, and to the city of Leesberg.
The 1950 Comprehensive Development Plan proposed a loop sys-
tem for traffic circulation in the downtown area. First Avenue,
where it intersected with Main Street, would be extended north-
easterly in a semicircular fashion to form the northern segment of
the loop; Indiana Street, designated as a major arterial street, would
be widened and would form the southern segment. In addition to
providing convenient movement around the business district, the
study pointed out that the loop concept "will allow the north part of
the Center City business district to be regenerated. . . . It is rec-
ommended that the north loop of the traffic system (First Avenue
extended) be acquired first and the parking lots in this area de-
veloped first."
Nothing came of the proposal to extend First Avenue. Indiana
Street continued to serve as the major east-west artery through
the business area and by 1960 had become the second most heavily
traveled east-west street in the city. In 1959 the traffic volume on
Indiana Street at the point where it approached the western edge
of the downtown area was approximately 10,000 vehicles per day.
The importance of improving the carrying capacity of Indiana
Street in the downtown area was pointed out in the state's 1960
Major Street and Highway Plan.
The early development of Indiana Street . . . is highly
desirable to reduce traffic circulation in the central busi-
ness district. Particular emphasis shall be placed upon
developing Indiana Street ... as [a] preferential street
. . as soon as possible. This will . . . encourage the utili-
zation of [this street] . . . by through traffic with the con-
current reduction of this traffic from nearby streets.
The state had already approved a contract, entered into in 1960,
between the university and the city to widen Indiana Street where
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it traversed the university. Improvement of Indiana Street from
the university area eastward along the southern edge of the busi-
ness district was given top construction priority in the state report.
What was the impact of the Center Circle project on the planning
for traffic circulation? The major structure of the project as
planned (and as subsequently built) sat astride the Indiana Street
right-of-way for almost the entire three blocks of its downtown
length. The plan called for dead-ending Indiana Street at the
point where it entered the western part of the project, vacating
the next three blocks eastward (with the exception of a half block
to be used as an entrance drive), and then dead-ending the other
end of Indiana Street at the east end of the project. In other words,
instead of Indiana Street being improved (as called for in the
state report) to better serve the burgeoning east-west traffic, it
was now to become a dead-end feeder street for the project.7
The project planners recognized, however, that something would
have to be done about traffic movement in the vicinity of the
project. They proposed that the city undertake as one of its obli-
gations "improvements to access and street widening essential to
the success of the development." These improvements turned out
to consist of widening and four-laning the three-block strips on the
east, south, and west sides of the project, at an estimated cost of
265,000 dollars. No proposal was made for solving the east-west
throughway problem.
The impact of the project on traffic circulation has already been
felt on Main Street. In the 1950 Comprehensive Plan it was pointed
out that the practice of diagonal parking on Main Street was not
conducive to a free flow of traffic. Only one lane of traffic was
left open each way, and every time a car backed out of a parking
place, the traffic on that side of the street would have to stop. The
Plan recommended parallel parking. For fourteen years the city
did not act on the recommendation, in part because some city offi-
cials felt that the public would object, and in part apparently be-
cause of resistance from the downtown merchants; the change to
parallel parking would mean the loss of twenty-four on-street
places. In 1964, with Indiana Street dead-ended and with widening
underway on the Center Circle project's perimeter streets, the traf-
fic situation finally deteriorated to the point where the city acted
to implement the recommendation.
At first, the reaction to the improved traffic movement on Main
Street was favorable; even the downtown merchants seemed
7 It is of interest to note that the plan commission several years later
did get around to recommending adoption of the state's 1.960 Major Street
and Highway Plan. During the course of the plan commission discussions
it was dryly pointed out that the Plan would have to be amended since
Indiana Street as well as other streets had already been vacated in the
Center Circle tract. As amended, the Plan was adopted by the city council.
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pleased. Less than a year later, however, there was a business de-
cline on Main Street (estimated by some to be as high as thirty per
cent) and the merchants began having second thoughts. Worried
about their future and in particular their relationship to the project,
they started agitating for the old angle parking on Main Street.
This in turn produced in the local newspapers' "letters" columns a
flurry of protests by those who had come to enjoy the improved
traffic movement on Main Street. Parking was not their problem;
there was ample parking in the lots at Center Circle or at the
stores in Leesberg. With Indiana Street blocked by the project,
what the public wanted was an east-west traffic carrier. So far
angle parking has not been restored to Main Street.
2. ZONING
The nine-square-block project site itself (one block south of Main
Street) did not present any particular problem with regard to zon-
ing. Most of the area included in the site was zoned B-2, Central
Business. The other type of business district provided for by the
Center City zoning ordinance was B-i, Neighborhood Business.
The B-1 classification expressly provided for shops and stores for
the conduct of retail business. B-2 permitted "any use permitted in
B-1 district" plus additional heavier business uses: hospitals,
laundry plants, railroad stations, and heavier residential uses (such
as multiple family dwellings and motels)."
Although the existing zoning was satisfactory for the project site
itself, the zoning for the blocks adjacent to the site presented a
serious problem for the promoters. The adjacent blocks (with
one minor exception) were also zoned B-2. This meant that
future competitors could occupy land on the perimeter of the site
and capitalize on both the influx of retail shoppers and the munici-
pally supplied off-street parking. It will be recalled that the princi-
pal reason why the chain wanted to locate in the central business
district rather than build a conventional shopping center on the
outskirts of the city was to avoid direct competition. The poten-
tial seriousness of this threat was alluded to in the promoters' plan;
one of the actions required from the city was "the revision of the
City's zoning ordinance in order to protect the commercial core of
Center City."
Any doubt as to what the promoters had in mind was dispelled
at the plan commission meetings held in May and June 1961. The
proposed new zoning classification-multiple family residential
-and its application to the area adjacent to the site would exclude
business from the areas on the east, south, and west of the project
site and authorize multiple family residences instead.
8 In addition the ordinance provided two industrial districts, I-1, light
industrial; and 1-2, heavy industrial. There was no shopping center clas-
sification.
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The history of this concept in zoning is enlightening. Following
the plan commission meeting on May 22, 1961, members of the
commission met informally in the office of the mayor to discuss the
promoters' proposal for rezoning the perimeter areas. The com-
missioners agreed to meet again the following night for further
discussion. On May 25 a notice was published in the local news-
paper announcing a public hearing to be held on the afternoon of
June 9 to consider the adoption of a new zoning classification and
its application to the perimeter properties. The commission chair-
man opened the public hearing on June 9 by asking X, the lawyer,
who was a member of the plan commission, to explain the history
of Center Circle and describe the plans for the development. In the
course of his talk X stressed the necessity of keeping the proposed
business extension "closed in tight" by a buffer of land that could
not be put to retail use. He pointed out that, in light of the pro-
posed cost of the development to the promoters, "$5 million, $6 mil-
lion, $7 million, it is reasonable for these to expect some reasonable
protection to ensure the success of their operation." He closed by
reminding the commission and the audience that the city council
had already publicly declared itself committed to the plan. X then
introduced a representative of the promoters' economic consul-
tants, who reported on the economic survey, and congratulated the
city and the promoters for their efforts. Next X introduced a rep-
resentative of the promoters' planning consultant, who also con-
gratulated the city and the promoters. Both X and the chairman of
the plan commission joined in explaining the expectation of addi-
tional sales tax and real estate tax revenues that would accrue to
the city as a result of the proposed development. After some dis-
cussion regarding the details of the proposed zoning classification,
and the specific properties to be included in the zone, the chairman
announced that the commission would take the matter under ad-
visement, and forward its recommendations to the city council.
The meeting then adjourned. Following the meeting the commis-
sion met privately with the promoters' consultants for several hours.
The plan commission met again on June 14. They now had be-
fore them specific ordinances incorporating the new classification.
The zone was to be called "RM-Multiple Family Residential-High
Density." Permitted uses were to be single and multiple family
residences, and public and semipublic uses, such as churches and
playgrounds. The ordinance also provided for "Conditional Uses
When Authorized by the Plan Commission and City Council." In-
cluded in the conditional uses were filling stations, undertaking
establishments, and commercial parking. Restaurants and shops
could be authorized only if they were part of "a supporting facility"
and only if all entrances were from within the building and there
was no exterior advertising (except "a four square foot name
plate").
9 Quotations are taken from the newspaper account of the hearing.
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A second ordinance was presented, applying the RM classifica-
tion to the properties in the blocks surrounding the Center Circle
project on the east, south, and west. The ordinance then singled
out some of the listed properties and stated that these tracts were
"restricted to conditional uses," citing the relevant provision of the
proposed ordinance creating the RM classification.
Why did the RM classification contain the "conditional uses"
provision with its curiously specific categories? What was its
purpose and why should the promoters agree to any exceptions
in the classification? The answer seems readily apparent. The
specifically authorized conditional uses exactly described the com-
mercial establishments which were already situated in the area
designated for the project site. If the promoters were to take over
these sites, some provision would have to be made for the relocation
of these businesses. The more desirable locations, of course, would
be adjacent to the shopping center. And, in fact, in the ordinance
applying RM, the specific relocation sites had already been select-
ed. 10
After some discussion and minor amendments, the plan commis-
sion unanimously voted to recommend the ordinances to the city
council. On June 19, 1961, the commission's proposed ordinances
were adopted by the city council without discussion. It was not
long, however, before the difficulty in maintaining the protective
zoning became apparent. Eventually the RM zoning became a
major headache for the plan commission, causing the resignation
under protest of one of the commissioners and open battling on
the floor of the city council.
The inroads into the zoning began innocently enough in Octo-
ber 1961 with a request to rezone a lot on the outer fringes of the
perimeter area from RM to B-2 to permit a barber shop. Neither
the plan commission nor the city council saw any particular reason
for not granting the request. The property was located several
blocks away from the actual project site, and presumably the pro-
moters did not object to the change.
Early in January 1962, another request for rezoning was made.
This involved a large tract on the east side of the project and im-
mediately across the street from Center Circle. The proposal was
to use the tract for a new-car agency. In this case the promoters of
Center Circle specifically supported the change; X participated in
the preparation of the proposal and in obtaining the swift approval
of both the plan commission and the city council."
10 At a later date the plan commission was requested to consider drop-
ping the conditional use provision. One of the conditional uses was elim-
inated because the commercial establishment had already relocated. Two
other conditional uses were not eliminated because those particular busi-
nesses had not yet reached decisions about relocating.
11 At the plan commission meeting at which the request was considered,
X stated for the record that he would abstain from voting.
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Late in 1962 two cases involving the RM classification arose;
both created some controversy. The first involved a business to be
relocated out of the project area. The business had found a new
site a block south of the project site, in an area still zoned R-2,
multiple family residential. The promoters decided that the
easiest thing to do would be to extend the RM classification; an ad-
ditional "conditional use" would have to be added to the ordinance.
Without any notice, and without holding a public hearing, the
plan commission considered and approved the proposed changes and
forwarded a recommendation for the changes to the city council.
At the council meeting on November 19 the proposal came under
fire. A member of the audience questioned the plan commission's
acting in secrecy. The city attorney responded that the commis-
sion had the authority to act in "executive session." It was pointed
out that there was no provision in the RM zoning classification re-
quiring notice or hearings for consideration of a "conditional use."
A councilman inquired as to the identity of the business seeking
the zoning change. X, the lawyer, serving as acting chairman of
the plan commission, refused to reveal the information on the floor
of the council meeting, but reminded the council that delaying ac-
tion on the zoning changes would cause delay to the Center Circle
development. After some heated debate, the council eventually
approved the recommendations of the plan commission, thus al-
lowing the business to move to its new site. The council did add
a direction to the plan commission either to drop the conditional
use provision from the RM zone or else spell out a fifteen-day no-
tice requirement. The notice requirement was subsequently added
to the ordinance.
At about the same time another request was before the plan com-
mission. This one involved a change from RM to B-2 for a corner
tract a block west of the Center Circle development. The pro-
ponents, two local attorneys, desired to build a law office. The re-
quest came before the plan commission on November 12. The com-
mission, for reasons that are not entirely clear, voted against the
change. At the council meeting of November 19 the city attorney
presented a prepared ordinance to the council providing for the
granting of the requested change, and containing a statement to
the effect that the plan commission had approved the request.
When the inaccuracy of this statement was called to the attention of
the council, the city attorney assured the council that there had
been a typographical error; the word "not" had been inadvert-
ently omitted. The council, after permitting an amendment to in-
sert the missing "not," voted to adopt the ordinance granting the
requested change.
The next day one of the members of the plan commission (a lead-
ing banker) wrote the mayor, tendering his resignation. The letter
referred to the incident of the previous evening, and expressed
serious doubt that the inaccuracy was in fact a typographical
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error. The banker went on to point out that there had been other
instances involving enforcement of regulations and "spot zoning"
requests that served to shake his faith in the city's desire for ade-
quate planning and zoning enforcement. He closed with the state-
ment that in the future he would work for effective and impartial
zoning and planning from outside the plan commission.
The resignation did little to retard the piecemeal treatment of
the RM zone. One or more changes in the zone were considered
by the plan commission or city council in meetings on May 27, 1963;
June 3, 1963; July 22, 1963; August 5, 1963; October 29, 1963; No-
vember 11, 1963; January 13, 1964; and February 10, 1964. In each
instance the plan commission recommended approval of the re-
quested change into or out of the RM zone, and with few excep-
tions the city council granted the recommended request.
By February 1964, however, the plan commission began to evi-
dence a weariness of the whole operation. At the meeting of Feb-
ruary 24 the plan commission considered a proposal to extend the
RM zone to take in additional blocks all around the perimeter-in
effect, to deepen the zone. After a lengthy hearing, attended by
some fifty interested persons, the commission voted to refer the
whole matter to the zoning committee (appointed by the mayor)
for further study. At the same meeting they turned down a re-
quest to rezone a tract within the RM zone to B-1 or B-2. At the
next meeting, on April 30, 1964, the commission agreed to rezone an
RM tract, but only after lengthy discussion and two dissenting
votes. The old pattern had not yet been broken, however; further
changes were considered and approved in two meetings in May.
The problem the plan commission and the city council, not to
mention the property owners involved, had with the RM zoning
stemmed directly from the purpose for which it was conceived. It
was designed to protect the economic position of the merchants
who would occupy the Center Circle stores by preventing competing
businesses from establishing themselves in the adjacent blocks.
Thus it was not to exclude businesses that were not directly com-
petitive, and which might serve as feeders to attract additional cus-
tomers to the area. Nor was it to prevent businesses already es-
tablished within the project site from being relocated in the periph-
ery-an enticing opportunity that apparently aided the promot-
ers in acquiring needed properties.
Even under the best of circumstances, and in the implementation
of a well-conceived and carefully documented plan for the over-all
growth and development of a community, individual zoning deci-
sions are difficult exercises in the art of judicious line drawing.
Under the circumstances involved in the RM zoning, it seems quite
probable that those members of the plan commission and city
council without a direct economic or political interest in the Center
Circle development found decision making awkward, if not down-
right uncomfortable.
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A second factor may have contributed to the frequency with
which the RM zoning was amended and reamended. Early in 1962
the plan commission and city council denied a request by certain
property owners for a change from multiple family residential
(R-2) to business zoning on a tract on Indiana Street near the
university. The property owners took their request to the courts,
and in October 1962 the circuit court ruled against the city. It
held that the zoning classification, under the circumstances and in
the light of the surrounding uses was, in the usual judicial verbi-
age with which the courts disguise their city planning activity,
"arbitrary, confiscatory, and without reasonable relation to the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare." The case was
eventually heard in the state supreme court; the trial court's deci-
sion was affirmed.
The possible parallel between this case and the RM situation did
not escape the attention of either the petitioning property owners
or the city officials. In several instances the property owners had
suggested resort to the courts in the event of an unfavorable vote.
As a result, some of the city officials were, at the least, somewhat
gun-shy.
3. PARKING
The significance of the program of exclusionary zoning cannot be
fully appreciated until viewed in the context of the parking prob-
lem for Center Circle, and the solution proposed by the promoters
and adopted by the city.
In the promoters' Project Summary one of the obligations listed
for the city was "the provision of off-street metered parking facili-
ties." It was explained that adequate parking facilities are of vital
importance to any major retail development, but that "the high
land cost of this downtown property will not allow the develop-
ment to provide free parking." It was argued that pay parking
facilities can be accomplished best by municipal rather than private
action for three reasons: (1) the parking benefits all downtown
stores, not just the project area; (2) the power of eminent domain
may be required to acquire adequate parking area; and (3) the
parking facilities can be financed on more favorable terms by a
municipality than by private individuals.
The need for expanded off-street parking facilities in the down-
town area had long been recognized. The 1950 Comprehensive De-
velopment Plan had urged the establishment of parking lots in the
north part of the downtown area as a priority item, and in addition
had recommended locating seven off-street parking lots in the nine-
block area which later constituted the Center Circle development.
These latter lots were to provide a total of 670 spaces; four of the
lots were to be municipally owned, three were "to be developed
by private enterprise."
The promoters, in their Project Summary, proposed that the city
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provide approximately one thousand parking spaces for the Center
Circle project. These spaces would be within the nine-block area
proper. It was estimated that the land the city would have to
buy would cost about three dollars and twenty-five cents per square
foot (the promoters' cost), or about 999,000 dollars total. This
would be financed by a new bond issue for parking facilities, making
it necessary to refinance a previous off-street parking facility bond
issue, at a cost of 207,000 dollars. This, plus other costs such as
malls and walks, meters, and site preparation, ran the total bond
issue needed to 1,591,000 dollars.
The total cost of financing the bond issue was not calculated in
the Project Summary. Nor was there a detailed explanation of how
the bond issue would be paid off. The report stated that the esti-
mated annual parking revenue from the lots in the project area
would be 165,800 dollars, and from other off-street lots, 10,000 dol-
lars. The average annual bond expenses were estimated to be
87,000 dollars. When on-street parking income and administration
expenses were included, the conclusion was that there would be a
net annual income to the city in the amount of 58,100 dollars. The
bases for the income figures were not shown, nor was the esti-
mated percentage of utilization. The report concluded that "it ap-
pears that the parking bonds can be supported by the expected
parking revenue; however these preliminary estimates should be
checked by municipal bond experts."
Apparently on the strength of the Project Summary's figures, the
city council, on May 15, 1961, as part of the resolution regarding the
Center Circle plan, authorized the off-street parking commission of
the city to undertake a revenue bond issue for additional off-street
parking in and near the downtown central business district, and to
obtain necessary engineering and legal services. And, as noted
earlier, on June 19, 1961, the council passed a motion, offered by
the chairman of the off-street parking commission, authorizing the
parking commission and city attorney, as a committee,
to approve the terms of options, including price, for the ac-
quisition of real estate that may in the future become a
part of the parking system of the City . . . in connection
with the extensions of the central business district, and
that [the Center Circle promoters] . . . be requested to ex-
ercise those approved options and convey to the city . . .
upon payment of their costs from proceeds made available
through a sale of parking revenue bonds.
The legal effect of this motion is open to question. The general
ordinances of the city provided that:
No member of the city council, or other officer of the city,
shall expend or contract for the expenditure of any money
belonging to the city, or incur any liability on the part of
the city for the improvement of any street, sidewalk, alley,
building or other property belonging to or under the con-
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trol of the city, unless authorized to do so by ordinance or
resolution of the city council.
This type of provision, that the city bind itself only by formal
ordinance or resolution, is a not unusual safeguard against hasty
action by the governing body of a municipality. The motion of
June 19 was not in the form of either an ordinance or a formal
resolution.
In any event, the council showed no inclination to reconsider its
position. In September 1962 a report entitled Center City Central
Business Area Extension-Parking Facilities Analysis was prepared
"for presentation to the City of Center City and the Center City
Parking Commission." The report was authored by the promoters'
economic consultants. It pointed out that one of the major assump-
tions on which the analysis was based was that the "new parking
facilities to be developed in conjunction with Center Circle will be
. . . operated for the maximum convenience of Center Circle shop-
pers." On the basis of an assumed 1,100 metered spaces to be pro-
vided for Center Circle, the study concluded that the total bond
issue needed, for the new facility and for refinancing the old park-
ing bonds, was 2,164,000 dollars. This figure was 573,000 dollars
higher than the Project Summary estimate of a year earlier.
A month later the city council hired a local firm of consulting
engineers to do a feasibility report on the bond issue and the
parking situation. A favorable report would be a prerequisite to
selling the proposed bonds. In the spring of 1963 the engineers
issued their Feasibility Report on Public Parking for Center City.
Once again the estimated cost to the city for its share of the Center
Circle project had risen. The engineers calculated the cost of the
parking facility-land, construction, engineering--to be 2,197,690
dollars, exclusive of refinancing costs. Refunding of the old bonds,
interest payments during the construction period, and various ad-
ministrative expenses added another 576,944 dollars. This total
raised the city's ante more than 1,000,000 dollars over the figure
given in the Project Summary.
Despite the increase in costs, the report concluded that the pro-
ject was financially sound. The bonds could be retired in thirty
years from parking revenues alone. The estimated debt coverage
was 1.78; not only would the project be self-sustaining, but it
would provide a source of income to the city.
The engineers had as the basis for their conclusions a series of
projections about the future economc development of Center City.
Some of these projections were set out in the Feasibility Report
in the usual welter of graphs, charts, and numerical columns. If
one were patient enough, he might deduce from this material that
the report projected an average day peak utilization of the pro-
posed Center Circle lots at 81 per cent in 1965 and 90 per cent in
1969. At the time the report was prepared (1963), the actual peak
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utilization of the existing parking system was 43 to 54 per cent.
Presumably the projected parking utilization figures were based
upon the projected annual sales figure for Center Circle. For the
year 1965 this figure was given as 12.5 million dollars, which works
out to be about 60 per cent of the estimated total of all other down-
town sales as projected in the report. In other words, the 1965 pro-
jection gave the Center Circle shops alone over half as much in
sales as all the other stores in downtown Center City combined.
Curiously enough, the drafters of the report did not seem to think
that there would be any adverse impact whatever on the downtown
merchants even if Center Circle was able to take that large a share
of the market; the graph of the projected "typical downtown sales"
for 1965 showed a line with a steady upward trend unaltered by the
advent of Center Circle. Nevertheless, on the basis of the Feasibil-
ity Report the city council had, by May 28, 1963, obtained a pur-
chaser for the bonds, and on June 14 the bond ordinance was for-
mally approved and the bonds were issued.
The issue was for 3,200,000 dollars, which included funds for
three other lots besides those in the Center Circle complex. (One of
the three was a lot immediately adjacent to Center Circle, and was
designed to handle overflow from the project lots.) Interest on
the bonds would eventually add up to 2,434,683 dollars, so that the
total capital cost of the parking lot project would come to 5,634,683
dollars. The author of the early Project Summary was obviously
correct when he suggested his 1.5 million dollar figure was a pre-
liminary estimate and should be checked.
By the end of the month the city had paid the promoters 1,642,272
dollars out of the bond proceeds and had become owner of a major
portion of the nine-square-block area.12 Thus the effect of the
transaction was that Center City bought the bulk of the property
in the nine-block area at prices negotiated between the promoters
and the private owners, at a net cost to the city which exceeded by
more than one-half million dollars the figure of 999,000 dollars
originally proposed in the promoters' Project Summary.
The 3.2 million dollars in bonds issued by the city were in the
form of revenue bonds, and as such were obligations against the
revenue of the parking system only, and not general obligations of
the city. The state law then in effect governing the issuance of
bonds for financing municipal off-street parking facilities provided
that "such bonds shall be payable solely and only from the revenues
to be derived from the operation of any or all of [the] .. .parking
facilities . . . ," with an exception for revenues received from ad-
vertising signs placed on meters.' 3
12 The city had already sold to the promoters for $180,000 the city
property that was in the project area and formerly used for parking and
was now needed by the promoters for their building.
1a The statute was subsequently amended to authorize payment of park-
ing facility bonds from "general tax funds, special assessments, special
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But the Center City bond ordinance contained an additional ex-
ception. After the usual paragraphs spelling out the funding and
amortization schedules, the ordinance stated:
In addition to the foregoing the bonds shall be redeemable
at par and accrued interest and without premium, in whole
or in part, but only on May 1, 1966, from moneys in the
Bond Reserve Account received on account of any contract
between the City and any company, firm, association or
person entered into for the purpose of inducing the City
to acquire and construct any portion of the facilities ac-
quired or constructed from the proceeds of these bonds.
This rather cryptic provision took on added meaning when the
first of the required annual administrative reports for the ex-
panded system was released in the spring of 1965.14 This report
covered six full months and part of a seventh of operation of the
Center Circle parking facility, which had opened in the fall of 1964.
The average monthly revenue anticipated in the 1963 Feasibility
Report from the Center Circle operation, for the year 1965, was
19,630 dollars; the actual monthly revenue for the first seven
months of operations averaged under 6,000 dollars. On the basis
of the estimates in the 1963 Feasibility Report, the actual revenues
produced between 24 and 29 per cent of the anticipated 1965 reve-
nues. The administrative report indicated that unless drastic im-
provement was obtained, the parking system might not even be
able to meet the interest payments (which amounted to 136,000 dol-
lars in 1965), much less retire the bonds.
Substantial consternation was evident among the city fathers
following issuance of the report. There was even some talk of a
direct subsidy from general revenue funds, although the possible
political repercussions of such a step kept discussion to a minimum.
One recommendation that was shortly implemented was the
elimination of the system of paying parking charges to an attendant
at the entrance to the lots; instead the lots were completely meter-
ed, and meter enforcement was materially stepped up. As of this
writing, it remains to be seen whether these and similar steps will
be enough to save the bonds from default, and whether the "con-
tract for inducement" provision will be called into play.
D. The Public Cost of Private Improvement
Center Circle was lauded by its promoters and supporters as an
outstanding-indeed unique-example of private redevelopment; a
taxation, revenue bonds, parking fees, special charges, rents or by any
combination of such methods."
14 The bond ordinance contained a requirement, imposed by the bond
houses which purchased the issue, that an annual study would be made of
the operation of the system. This was in addition to the annual audit of
the parking commission's books.
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demonstration of what could be done by private initiative without
the crutch of public power and public funds. We have already
looked at some aspects of the role that government in fact played
in the development of Center Circle. In view of the widespread
belief that this was indeed private enterprise at its best and on its
own, it is necessary to examine more closely the exact extent of
the city's financial commitment to Center Circle.
Center City has a general fund budget involving something over
a half-million dollars in annual expenditures. This is the budget
that provides for the police and fire departments, the operation
of the city buildings and utilities, and the numerous other ac-
tivities of the government of a small city. The largest source of
income to the general fund is the general property tax, followed
closely by the retailers' occupation tax (sales tax), and the utility
tax. Each year an annual report is published, entitled Center City
-Audit Report, in which the year's financial operations under the
general fund are summarized. This report, however, reveals only
part of the city's fiscal picture.
The millions of dollars committed in support of the Center Circle
project through the off-street parking operation, previously de-
scribed, were channeled through a separately maintained series of
accounts known as the motor vehicle parking system fund. In
addition to this fund and the general fund, there are five other
separate "funds" through which the city operates its finances: a
special assessment fund; a storm drainage construction fund; a mo-
tor fuel tax fund; a municipal building construction fund; and a
firemen's and policemen's pension fund. Each of these funds is
separately maintained, separately audited, and separately reported
on. Each, with the exception of the pension fund, was utilized by
the promoters, with the assistance of the city administration, in the
financing of Center Circle.
1. THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT AND MOTOR FUEL TAX FUNDS
These funds were the vehicle through which the street improve-
ments circling the Center Circle project were accomplished. The
special assessment fund was originally established to facilitate the
financing of local street improvements. The typical procedure in-
volves a determination by the city to undertake a specific project,
usually with the consent of the adjacent property owners; the
selling of ten-year bonds by the special assessment fund in suffi-
cient amounts to pay for the project construction; and then the
retiring of the bonds from monies received in part by assessing
the properties adjacent to the improvement and in part from the
motor fuel tax fund.
The motor fuel tax fund is the recipient of money paid to Center
City, in accordance with state law, as the city's share of the state's
motor fuel tax. This amounts to about 170,000 dollars a year.
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The money is used by the Center City administration to defray part
of the costs of local improvements under the special assessment
fund, and to pay the city's share of other road improvements, such
as those shared with the county or other governmental units.
In the case of Center Circle, it was noted earlier that the pro-
moters' Project Summary called for "improvements to access and
street widening essential to the success of the development." The
estimated cost of these improvements was given as 265,000 dollars.
The actual work involved the widening and four-laning of the
streets on each side of the nine-block site. The job was undertaken
in two parts, each part of which was financed through the special
assessment fund. The construction cost for the first part, roughly
half the improvements required, was about 316,000 dollars, of which
13,000 dollars was to be paid by assessment against the adjacent
property owners, and the balance of 303,000 dollars by allocations
from the motor fuel tax fund. The second part of the improve-
ment is estimated at slightly less, 297,000 dollars, substantially all of
which will be provided for by fuel tax monies.
When the cost of retiring the bonds, including principal and
interest, is added, the motor fuel tax fund will pay about 745,000
dollars over the next ten years for the Center Circle "access and
street widening essential to the success of the development."',
This represents a commitment of over 40 per cent of the city's street
improvement money for the next ten years. If other major street
improvements are to be undertaken, or if the many minor im-
provements are to be continued, the money will presumably have to
come from general fund revenues, or from substantially increased
assessments of affected property owners.
The general fund has already felt the impact of the drain on the
street improvement money. In 1957 the city attorney and the city
engineer became regular salaried employees of the city. Thereafter
the special assessment fund reimbursed the general fund for the
legal and engineering services provided by these employees in con-
nection with street improvement projects. In 1962 this amounted to
about 41,000 dollars, which was paid into the city's general reve-
nues from money in the special assessment fund and the motor fuel
tax fund. The audit report of the general fund for 1963 noted
that neither of these funds had made a transfer to the general
fund for 1963, and estimated the amount owed the general fund at
40,000 dollars. The following year's report carried a similar nota-
tion. There is no reason to believe that the financial prospects of
the motor fuel tax fund, and hence the special assessment fund,
will materially improve during the next ten years, and no reason to
expect that the transfers will be resumed until they do. By that
time the general fund, and the taxpayers who support it, will have
15 The Project Summary's estimate was once again on the low side, this
time by some 280%.
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in effect underwritten the operations of the two street improve-
ment funds to the extent of about 400,000 dollars. 16
2. THE STORM DRAINAGE CONSTRUCTION FUND AND THE
MUNICIPAL BUILDING CONSTRUCTION FUND
The amount committed to Center Circle through these funds was
relatively small, about 12,000 dollars, but the method is instruc-
tive. The storm drainage construction fund was established in 1959
as a result of the sale of 2,275,000 dollars in bonds, the proceeds
from which were earmarked for specific drainage works and im-
provements in various parts of the city. These improvements
turned out to cost less than the amount obtained from the bond
sale. In 1963 the city council authorized the transfer of the un-
committed balance in the fund to the municipal building construc-
tion fund, a separate account established to build up a reserve for
the eventual erection of a new city hall.
At the same time, and before the transfer was made, the promot-
ers found that about 31,000 dollars in drainage works would be
required at the Center Circle site to handle the increased runoff.
This work was subsequently paid for from the funds remaining in
the storm drainage fund on a cost-sharing agreement between the
promoters and the city. The fund was subsequently reimbursed
for 19,000 dollars, leaving a net reduction in the amount available
for transfer of about 12,000 dollars.' 7
3. THE GENERAL FUND
In years past, the motor vehicle parking system fund had trans-
ferred its annual surplus to the general fund. In 1963, for example,
there was a transfer of 31,000 dollars into the general fund. The
following year no transfer was made. The auditors noted this
fact in their report and stated that, in view of the new bond issue,
"the MVPS Fund has to build up a reserve to meet with the legal
requirements of the new bond issue. Until there is an adequate
reserve the MVPS Fund will not be able to transfer parking meter
money to the General Fund."
Furthermore, during the construction of the Center Circle park-
ing lots, some 18,700 dollars in general funds, allocated for general
street lighting, were used to provide lights for the Center Circle
lots. In both of these cases the parking system, and through it
16 This assumes street improvements are continued at the same level as
in the past. If the status of the funds necessitates a cutback in operations,
then presumably the amount of required legal and engineering services
will be reduced. Such a cutback might in the long run be more injurious
to the citizens of Center City than the additional assessments required to
continue improvement of the streets.
17 Another $5,400 of the fund's balance was expended on two other
minor projects unrelated to Center Circle.
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Center Circle, was the beneficiary of funds otherwise allocated to
the city's general activities. In view of the financial straits of the
parking system, it is at best speculative as to when, if ever, the
accounts will be righted.18
In addition to direct costs to the city for the Center Circle project,
such as those described above, there were undoubtedly numerous
indirect costs, although in many cases it would be impossible to
isolate exact figures. One example will suffice. As a result of
Center Circle, the county's tax roll lost some 352,240 dollars in tax-
able property. This was the land, originally privately owned, that
became the parking facility for Center Circle. As it was now owned
by a governmental body, it was no longer available for taxation. 19
In summary, governmental support to the Center Circle project
consisted of 3.2 million dollars for parking; 745,000 dollars for street
construction; a possible 400,000 dollar loss to the general city reve-
nues resulting from the unreimbursed hidden administrative serv-
ices to the street improvement funds; 12,000 dollars for drainage
works at the site; 18,700 dollars for lighting; and an as yet unde-
termined loss, possibly as high as 31,000 dollars or more a year, by
the general city revenues of surplus income earned by the parking
system prior to the new bond issue. Thus the citizens and taxpay-
ers of Center City participated in the Center Circle project to the
tune of upwards of 4.5 million dollars; the promoters' Project Sum-
mary, upon which the decision by the city fathers to participate
had been based, stated the city's financial contribution would be
1,591,000 dollars for parking facilities and 265,000 dollars for street
construction, a total of about 1.86 million dollars. As the total
capital cost to the promoters of the project (including buildings
and land) was, according to their estimate, about 4.9 million dollars,
it can readily be seen that Center City was virtually an equal, if
unknowing, partner.
E. The Politics of Planning in the Public Interest
It took the city fathers of Center City fourteen years to eliminate
angle parking on Main Street despite the fact that independent
studies had long condemned this blockage of traffic. It officially
took the city government only one council meeting to approve the
Center Circle project. As far as the city and the promoters were
concerned, the project became a reality on the night of May 15, 1961,
when it was first announced. The city was not legally bound to
Is There was some manipulating of accounts within the general fund
itself, as well as between funds. For example, about $4,000 was trans-
ferred from one account in the general fund to another to enable the
latter account to meet unanticipated costs incurred in connection with
electrical improvements required at the Center Circle site.19 This loss is to some extent compensated for by the increase in as-
sessed value of the property remaining in private hands in the Center
Circle site.
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fulfill its promises to the developers, but the "resolution of intent"
made clear that the council would consider itself morally bound
and the unanimous vote demonstrated that those political leaders
who favored the project had the political strength to carry out
their intentions.
Subsequent events removed any doubts about the commitment of
the city. During the next thirty-five days the plan commission
and the council did as requested. By June 19 the critical zoning
legislation had been passed, and the council had passed a motion
committing itself to buy the land for the parking from the devel-
opers at their cost, and had set in motion the machinery to issue the
parking bonds. Any potential opposition was quickly put in the
unenviable position of having to get the council to take affirmative
action to rescind its prior commitments.
Given the scope of this project and the city's long history of
apathy, the council's action was, to say the least, amazing. One
would have assumed, at the very minimum, a prolonged public
controversy and several years of struggle. How, then, were the
promoters able to gain such speedy public approval? What skills
were needed to accomplish a feat of this magnitude?
In the summer of 1960 the department store chain had the favor-
able economic study. Prior to that time X and his group had
privately sounded out a few of the city officials, including the
mayor, about the project and had received a favorable response,
particularly with regard to the city furnishing the parking. Ap-
parently the chain regarded the assurances of public support as
sufficiently credible; in the fall of 1960 a Delaware corporation
was formed by the chain for the purpose of getting options on the
land in the project site. X's law office was the corporate office and
his secretaries served as the corporate officers. The elected offi-
cials officially knew nothing of these developments. No one except
a small group knew where the development was to be located or its
size. The landowners in the project area were not told about the
project, but they were advised that the land was going to be used
to help Center City. On the average, the price to be paid for the
land was three dollars and twenty-five cents per square foot, which,
in view of the character of the land, was very generous. Several of
the landowners who were interviewed said that they were inter-
ested in helping Center City. The promoters, then, were in the
happy position of being able to appeal to civic pride and at the same
time to reward virtue handsomely.
The strategy worked. At the time of the formal announcement
in May 1961, X was quoted as saying that all of the land on which
buildings were to be erected was under option, with the exception
of three service stations whose owners had agreed to co-operate.
The land needed for parking presumably could be taken through
the city's power of eminent domain if necessary, although the ap-
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pellate court of one state has since held that condemnation by a
city in a strikingly similar situation amounted to a conspiracy to
wrongfully appropriate private property, entitling the property
owner to injunctive relief.20 As it turned out, condemnation pro-
ceedings were not necessary; all seventy-two parcels in the project
site were acquired through negotiation, although the threat of con-
demnation apparently was used against a few recalcitrant owners.
There was one incident, however, which gave the promoters a
few bad moments. Several of the parcels needed to complete the
project site were owned by the city and were being operated as
public parking lots. The city of course agreed to sell the lots to the
promoters, but state law required that a sale of such publicly owned
properties had to be advertised and submitted to public bidding.
A local businessman, who had been trying without success to get the
city to vacate an alley next to his place of business in another part
of town, announced that he was going to bid on one of the lots.
There was a flurry of negotiations, the alley was vacated, and the
businessman withdrew from the bidding.
Once the land was under contract, the promoters were ready to
obtain the necessary public support. In order to lessen the risk of
any slip-ups, the promoters' planners and economic consultants pre-
pared a detailed "battle plan," called the Project Summary. Under
a section appropriately entitled, "Realization of the Plan," the Sum-
mary stated:
Now . . . the scale of operations must change into one
which includes leadership from the City's elected represen-
tatives and its businessmen. Only through the whole-
hearted support of these factions will the project be able
to realize its full potential . . . . In order to do this, it is
necessary that the maximum potentials are fully compre-
hended, the aims endorsed, and their implementation given
active assistance. . . The City Council must now be pre-
pared to lead jointly with the City's businessmen to guide
the community in its acceptance of such a plan and its
realization.
The initial support was to be an "endorsement of the concrete
benefits to the City which will result from the plan." These bene-
fits included shifting the commercial activity back to Center City,
the "direct and indirect benefits to existing merchants," expand-
ed employment, the rise in property values, and a heavy emphasis
on a great increase in retail sales and tax revenues for the city.
But in return for all of these benefits, the city was to supply the
parking and improve the access streets. The report presented its
economic studies and concluded that not only would the city be
able to pay for these improvements but that the increased taxes
would provide an annual net gain to the city of more than 200,000
dollars.
20 Reel v. City of Freeport, 61 Ill. 2d 448, 209 N.E.2d 675 (1965).
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On May 7, 1961, an informal presentation of the plan was made
to certain interested individuals. This presentation included the
promoters' printed "battle plan." Shortly before the public an-
nouncement of the plan, the council members were "apprised" of
the project in a series of unofficial meetings; the unanimous vote on
the night of May 15 speaks for itself. The project had not been of-
ficially before the city government, there were no independent stud-
ies, and the council members relied completely on the representa-
tions of the promoters and their group. Nevertheless, step one of
the "battle plan" was accomplished that night-"the aims" were
"endorsed" by the government.
At this point two of the potential obstacles facing the promoters
were overcome: the individual landowners in the project site
were under contract, and the political leaders were publicly com-
mitted to support the project. But much more would have to be
done than merely getting the city's endorsement. As the "battle
plan" pointed out, there had to be the "wholehearted support" of
all "factions" in the city if the project was to be realized. This was
accomplished through an extensive public relations blitz which
began on the night of the announcement, continued unabated dur-
ing the critical plan commission meetings in June, and reached its
climax at the formal opening over three years later.21
The resolution of May 15, introduced by the city attorney, re-
ferred rather vaguely to "a plan." What was presented, however,
were glowing and detailed descriptions, pictures, tables, and
charts. The following day the two local newspapers carried nu-
merous stories and displayed several large reproductions of artist's
models of how the project was to look at completion. The chairman
of the board of directors of the chain hailed the council's action as
"one of the nation's truly great examples of local leadership recog-
nizing the downtown urban problem and coming to grips with it. ' '22
In return X described the vice-president of the chain as "a very
civic minded individual" who "is strongly of the belief that the
business district is the core of a city. He believes that this has to
do with the pride and spirit of a city. He feels that business dis-
tricts should not be allowed to deteriorate to become eyesores
driving people out to outlying shopping centers." The newspapers
21 The formal opening was attended by some 4,000 to 5,000 persons, ac-
cording to newspaper estimates. In attendance for the festivities were
both the president and the board chairman of the national retail chain, and
the Governor of the state. The two Senators sent personal regrets. There
were the usual massed marching bands, speeches, and dignitary high jinks.
Local police were put on special twelve-hour shifts for the four-day cel-
ebration. It was later announced that the chain had $28,000 in sales the
first day.
22 In a moment of candor at the formal opening some three years later,
the board chairman stated that the chain had attempted to interest other
cities in the Center Circle type of project, but "we have never before been
able to get a city to do the job."
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themselves picked up this great swell of civic pride. One of the
full-page headlines proclaimed, "Save Center City's Business Was
Basic Idea Behind Redevelopment Plan." The article confidently
predicted that the "citizens of Center City can expect nothing but
roses from the new downtown development project .... " Coun-
cil members outdid each other in extolling the project.
Most significant was the way the promoters handled the Main
Street merchants. The project to be constructed (initially called
"Stage One") lies one block south of the Main Street merchants.
The economic study predicted that the area could comfortably sup-
port 100,000 square feet of retail shopping space, but Stage One
called for 234,000 square feet. Aside from the fact that Stage One
itself might be overly ambitious, it raised acutely the question of
the impact on the Main Street merchants. It would appear that
these merchants, their business already depressed, could not help
but lose further to competing stores within the site. In the past
this group constituted a powerful political force for the status
quo.23
How did the promoters handle this potential source of opposition?
At the time of the announcement it was repeatedly and stoutly
maintained by the mayor and others that the increased flow of
traffic and customers would increase the sales of these merchants.
Of more importance was the repeated prediction that the final plans
of the project would not only include the Main Street merchants
but even extend one block north of Main Street. Half-page photo-
graphs of the artist's model showed the full extent of the plan with
Main Street included in the shopping complex. Main Street itself
was to be closed to traffic and absorbed into the shopping mall.
The photographs showed several modern high-rise office and apart-
ment buildings dotting the entire complex, and included models of
a theater and civic center. It was confidently predicted that within
ten years the Main Street merchants would be physically included
in this great and wonderful project. In the meantime they would
profit from the general rise in traffic and business.
The same intensive publicity continued at the plan commission
meetings. The relationship between the project and the existing
business district was stressed, with emphasis on the predicted
high-rise apartment buildings. The economic consultant appeared
and characterized Stage One as only a "pilot project for the down-
town business district." Even the proposed RM zoning classifica-
tion was explained in terms of helping the Main Street merchants.
"Low-grade businesses" had to be prevented from springing up on
the periphery of the project. In order for the project to expand
23 E.g., angle parking on Main Street was still in effect. For an in-
sightful discussion of the role of the Main Street merchant in local politics,
see WILLIAMS & ADRIAN, FOUR CiTiEs-A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLICY
MAKING ch. 6 (1963).
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northward and encompass Main Street, it would be necessary to
"hold and increase the value of existing businesses." In other
words, the Main Street merchants would surely suffer if business
was allowed to expand to the east, south, and west of the project.
No specific date was set for the extension of the project north to
Main Street. But the immediate purpose of the promoters was ac-
complished. The potential opposition from the Main Street mer-
chants never materialized. In fact, those merchants who were in-
terviewed seem to be optimistic as to their future. Unduly so?
The RM zone has been increasingly riddled with selective zoning
changes which will allow commercial development adjacent to the
project site, contrary to the promises of the promoters. Talk of the
extension of the project seems to have stopped not too long after
1961. In late 1963 the council passed an ordinance authorizing the
construction of all-weather canopies over the sidewalks on both
sides of Main Street to facilitate pedestrian traffic. This was a far
cry from the earlier artist's rendition of the plans for Main Street,
which gave the illusion of a mall, including the planting of trees
and shrubs, lighting, and infrared heating. The only mention of
the original plan was the rather neutral statement that the "deci-
sion to remodel [Main Street] was given impetus by the construc-
tion of the Center Circle shopping area." Two years later neither
mall nor canopy had appeared. The only physical evidence of
change on Main Street was the remodeling of a hardware store,
including the extensive improvement of its rear entrance which
faced away from Main Street and in the direction of Center Circle.
About the same time the mayor appointed a citizens committee of
downtown merchants and businessmen to study the downtown
problem.
In any event, those who had a direct economic conflict with the
project had been taken care of during the few short weeks after
the announcement. There were other potential sources of opposi-
tion. Some might be worried about the increased traffic and con-
gestion created by the project. Some would oppose the closing off
of arterial streets. Some might be worried about development prob-
lems in areas adjacent to the site. Some might doubt the ability of
the city to pay off the revenue bonds, and some might be opposed to
the city providing a parking subsidy to a private development.
Finally, some might be opposed to any change in Center City at
all. Whether or not this opposition was real or imaginary will
never be learned. The tactics of the promoters and their allies
were sufficiently thought through and sufficiently well-executed
that potential dissidents were never able to organize effectively.
The people of Center City never really knew anything concrete
prior to the announcement. When the project was announced, the
publicity and the swift-moving governmental machinery of this
heretofore lethargic town served to neutralize any potential oppo-
sition. Within just a little over a month's time, the basic public
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decisions had been made. During that period if any citizen wanted
to question the project, let alone oppose it, he was faced with the
unanimity of all the elected public officials, the two newspapers,
and the business and civic leaders.
Quite obviously the formation and execution of the Center Circle
project required an unusual breed of promoters. Who were these
men? What were their interests? And what were their connec-
tions with the local government?24
Y, the merchant, who along with X formed the nucleus of the
early "activist" group, died during the winter just preceding the
ground breaking for the project. He had run a prosperous hard-
ware store on Main Street but unlike his fellow business associates,
he did not share their complacent attitude. He viewed Center
City's situation realistically and quite early he became perhaps the
single most significant moving force in the community to improve
its economic development. It is reported that for three straight
years he did little else than work for the Center Circle project.
The position of X is more complex. He is a descendant of one of
the founding families of Center City and undoubtedly has a deep
civic commitment to the city. He owned, along with another, the
large hotel which was located in the project site. Not only was the
hotel to remain, but it became the focal point of the project. The
shopping center building was physically attached to two sides
of the hotel. The main entrance to the hotel dining room and
lobby now opened out onto a sidewalk cafe, which itself was an
integral part of the shopping mall. The hotel in effect became an
integrated unit in the Center Circle project, enjoying the economic
benefits of such a relationship. In the summer of 1965, less than a
year after Center Circle opened for business, X announced that he
had sold his interest in the hotel, which he had had for over
twenty years, to the retail chain. The price was not disclosed.
The two corporations which were used to effectuate the project
operated out of X's law office. His secretaries were the officers of
one corporation and he was the president of the other. One of
these, the Delaware corporation previously mentioned, was used
for the purpose of purchasing from the individual owners the prop-
erties needed for the project. This corporation subsequently sold a
portion of the properties-the land on which the project buildings
are now located-to the other corporation. The remaining proper-
ties were sold by the Delaware corporation to the city for the park-
24 While a reputational study would most likely have identified X, and
probably Y, as top leaders in Center City, the material presented here is
for the purpose of illuminating their role in the Center Circle project,
rather than to position them in the community's leadership structure. For
the shortcomings in the decision-making or event-analysis approach as a
means of providing data on leadership, see BELL, HILL & WRIGHT, PUBLIC
LEADERSHIP 28-30 (1961).
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ing lots. The corporation which owns the project buildings is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the retail chain, and was the purchaser
of X's interest in the hotel. Presumably X's law firm will continue
to handle the local legal business of the project.
The civic and economic interests of X were buttressed by his
political position. He appears to be one of the most, if not the
single most, powerful political figures in the community. He is a
leader of the power bloc which supports the mayor and a majority
of the city council, although ostensibly he is a declared member of
the political party which opposes these officials.2 5  He is also an
active member of the plan commission, the body that recommended
approval of the Center Circle plan, the vacation of the city streets,
and the zoning changes, and which did not conduct independent
studies or seek independent advice.
His activities as a plan commissioner deserve some elaboration.
On the night of the announcement of the project, it was X and not
the elected officials who supplied most of the background for the
newspapers, the praise for the promoters and the representatives of
the chain, and the glowing predictions for the future of the city.
At the first public plan commission meeting, on June 9, 1961, it was
X, as a commissioner, who presented the plan in all of its glowing
details and emphasized the commitment of the council (the week
before) to the plan. In support of the RM zoning change, X can-
didly pointed out the protective characteristics of the proposed
change. The chain, he said, "can't borrow money if the businesses
are allowed to expand all around, without planning, and not be
confined to a definite area." He was the one who argued that in
light of the proposed cost to the developers, "$5 million, $6 million,
$7 million, it is reasonable for these to expect some reasonable pro-
tection to ensure the success of their operation."
The official records of the plan commission clearly reveal X's
power. On several occasions he represented clients who wanted to
establish businesses within the RM zone. On one occasion, at X's
personal request to the secretary of the plan commission (who was
also the city attorney and a law partner of the chairman of the
plan commission), the published notice went out immediately, the
plan commission rescheduled its regular meeting to coincide with
the council's meeting, and with a minimum of delay the council
passed the necessary ordinance. On another occasion a client who
wanted a similar change encountered some minor opposition in the
city council. X appeared in support of the request, and in the en-
suing discussion the plan commission was accused of pressure tac-
tics and secrecy. On the occasion of a request for another zoning
change-the one which the plan commission voted down, the city
council granted anyway, and over which one of the plan commis-
25 Both he and one of his law partners have run for political office on
the opposition party ticket, although not for offices in local government.
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sioners resigned implying fraud-it is significant to note that X did
not vote when the plan commission decided not to approve the
request.
One final episode deserves mention. The zoning ordinances of
Center City require hotels to supply a certain amount of off-street
parking for their guests. X sold his hotel's parking lots to the
chain for part of the building site. Would the hotel now have to
purchase land to comply with the ordinance? At X's suggestion,
the hotel parking ordinance was amended to provide that "This re-
quirement shall be satisfied if such required amount of parking is
so located within a parking area available for use by the public
either for or without the payment of a parking fee and regardless
of by whom the same is owned and operated." Thus, the mu-
nicipally owned parking lots would serve not only the shopping
center's customers but also guests of X's hotel. 26
What were the roles of the government officials? The mayor
was an early confidant of X and his group. The mayor also was the
chairman of the parking commission which acted as the ultimate
coercive power necessary to complete the project site. The land of
two recalcitrant owners was designated for parking and they re-
ported that they sold under threat of condemnation. On one of
these sites was a funeral home which competed with a funeral
home owned by the mayor. How many council members were early
and active supporters of the project is not known. By the time it
was announced, all agreed to go along. And despite occasional pro-
tests that any time a council member asked a question he was ac-
cused of delaying the project, they continued to go along.
The supporters of Center Circle hail the project as a great ex-
ample of private capital working for the good of the community.
They claim with assurance that business in Center City will in-
crease, that there will be more jobs and more tax revenues.
Given the prior condition of the land uses in the project site and the
persistent economic stagnation in the community, the project, it is
argued, certainly is an improvement.
There would undoubtedly be general agreement that the Cen-
ter Circle complex made a significant contribution to shopping ease.
The interior is handsomely appointed, and the stores are well-inte-
grated around a central mall providing free movement from store
to store without having to go outside the heated and air-condi-
tioned structure. The project (despite its external resemblance to a
penitentiary caused by its high, solid brick walls) has been awarded
a citation for "excellence in environmental architecture" by a na-
tional association of architects.
Others point out, however, that these gains may be substan-
tially offset in the long run by other, less dramatic, effects of the
26 By special arrangement with the parking commission, the hotel pro-
vides free parking for its overnight guests.
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project. The promoters and their hired planners claimed that they
were planning for the community as a whole. They did not present
anything like a master plan, but they did present a plan for the re-
development of the entire central business district and discussed
its relation to the community as a whole. What they accomplished,
however, was a plan for only one section of the central business
district. Furthermore, the planning for their one section-the
nine-square-block site and the protective RM zone-was strictly
planning for the development and protection of their commercial
shopping center. The main section of the central business district,
Main Street, and the section that heretofore was of most concern to
those interested in improving the community as a whole, was in-
cluded in the planning of the promoters if and when their shop-
ping center expanded northward. In short, the planning for Center
Circle was planning in the public interest only to the extent that
the public interest is indirectly served by the bettering of private
economic conditions. At no stage in the history of the Center Circle
project was systematic disinterested professional thought given to
the relationship of the project to the over-all development of the
community. As noted earlier, there is no evidence that the deci-
sion makers, public or private, paid any attention to the existing
independent studies of the area's needs.
The planning for Center Circle left unresolved four principal
problems: Main Street, traffic, land uses in the areas adjacent to
the project site (including those beyond the RM zone), and the
financial condition of the parking lot operation. The promoters and
the public officials have spoken optimistically about the resolution
of these problems, but the evidence to back their claims seems, so
far, not convincing. And it would seem that a failure to resolve
these problems might cost Center City in the long run more than it
will gain from the project, and could even jeopardize the success of
the project itself. Whether or not this will happen depends on the
ability of the- community to prevent a further decline of Main
Street business, to come up with a successful program to handle the
impending crush of traffic, and to prevent the deterioration of
land uses surrounding the site.
The problems raised and left unresolved by Center Circle are of
considerable importance to the people of Center City. They are the
ones who will have to pay for planning errors-the inconvenience
of traffic congestion, the costs of spreading blight, the vacancies on
Main Street, and the overcommitted indebtedness. It is for this
reason that the legal procedures for public decision making con-
cerning the allocation and use of urban land are provided. These
procedures provide, on paper, full opportunity for the assertion and
consideration of the public interest in private programs.
In substance, none of this happened in Center City. X and his
small group of insiders, together with highly skilled outsiders-the
chain and the hired planners, presented the community with a
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take-it-or-leave-it package. The organs of government, instead of
serving the function of performing an independent public scrutiny,
merely implemented the private decisions and granted the public
support needed for the project. Under implicit and explicit
threats of obstructionism, not only were there no proposals for in-
dependent studies during the critical days of decision, but the record
reveals that no serious questions were ever raised by any of the
responsible elected public officials. Public meetings were held, as
prescribed by law, but for the most part they were used by the
promoters for public relations services; with minor exceptions, no
questions were raised by the citizens or the Main Street mer-
chants. Even the two local newspapers have had only praise for
the project.
The promoters and their group had effectively monopolized the
planning and political skills. The other affected groups in the
community, including the city council and the plan commission,
had neither skill, and the public decision-making apparatus was
easily manipulated to give the promoters the required public sup-
port. It would be easy to explain this "take over" of the Center
City government and the subversion of the democratic process in
terms of the reputed political and social characteristics of this
particular city: a one-party oligarchic government, an apathetic
citizenry, and so forth. And perhaps this is the most plausible
explanation of the history of the project. However, a comparison
of the Center City experience with the experiences of other ur-
ban redevelopments may shed light on a more generalized issue of
the politics of planning in a democratic context.
II. THE STRATEGIES OF PUBLIC URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
The differences between the public urban redevelopment pro-
jects of a large metropolitan center and the urban redevelopmnt
project of Center City are indeed great. The public projects in-
volve considerably more money, more people, and more interest
groups. The political and governmental environment is extraordi-
narily complex. The redevelopment decision makers have to in-
clude another actor in the process-the federal government-in
addition to the promoters and the local governmental units.27
27 The presence of a federal agency can introduce outside constraints
into the local decision-making process that otherwise might not be felt. For
example, Polsby cites the elaborate Housing and Home Finance Agency
regulations as one of the outside constraints which operated on the mayor
and his colleagues in the New Haven Redevelopment Agency. These reg-
ulations forced the local community to concern itself with questions such
as the extent of deterioration in the area to be redeveloped, how the city
plans to finance its share of the project, whether the area to be redevel-
oped is suitable for the proposed reuse according to accepted planning
practices, and whether the proposed reuse conforms to the city's master
plan and to good planning. See POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL
THEORY 74 (1963).
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However, despite these very great differences, an examination of
four public urban redevelopment projects will illustrate the func-
tion and importance of monopolizing political and planning skills
and the impact of this monopoly on democratic decision making.
The four examples are not simply repetitive. Each one shows a
different locus of decision-making power. Three of the projects
parallel the Center City experience in the sense that the initia-
tors or proponents of the project succeeded in carrying out their
projects substantially intact; in the fourth they did not.
A. Newark, New Jersey
Harold Kaplan, in a recently published study of the Newark Hous-
ing Authority, said the "keys" to the agency's success were elabor-
ate preliminary negotiations with the redevelopers and the federal
officials and "the low visibility of this preparatory stage. '28 When
the negotiations are completed the "local officials must accept the
[detailed project] package as is or risk jeopardizing the entire pro-
posal. '29
The first step of the Newark Housing Authority was to find a
private redeveloper and come to an agreement as to the site and the
redeveloper's particular needs. According to Kaplan, no local agen-
cy or participant had dealings with the redevelopers but the NHA.
Negotiations were then carried out between the NHA, the redevel-
oper, and the federal officials of the Urban Renewal Administration
and the Federal Housing Administration. This was the critical
phase of the project, but the payoff was that the legally required
local governmental approval is extremely likely if agreement can
be reached with the federal officials. If the local government at-
tempts to change the project, the results of the negotiation will be
upset and the federal funds will be delayed or stopped.
The next step that the NHA took before any announcement of the
project was to obtain the support of the mayor and several of the
municipal agencies. The two mayors who were in office during the
ten-year period of the study never presented major problems to the
NHA. For a variety of reasons, they were in agreement with the
goals and tactics of the NHA. The support of local agencies was
needed since area-wide programs often required street improve-
ments, school construction, and sewer and utility relocations. The
important local agencies were usually willing to go along since
their share of the municipal budget would be increased and the
federal funds served to help their own programs. The main prob-
lem of the NHA, however, was to avoid intervention by city hall
while at the same time obtaining the support of the local agencies.
The NHA did this by dealing with the staffs of the agencies rather
than the top men and by not disclosing the detailed project plans;
28 KAPLAN, URBAN RNEwAL POLITIcs 28-29 (1963).
29 Ibid.
SUMMER)
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
co-operative pledges were obtained on the basis of the general out-
lines of the project.
It was only after these basic commitments and agreements were
reached that the project was announced to the public (by a big
spread in the Sunday newspapers) and presented to the local gov-
ernmental units that had to give approval-the city council and the
central planning board. The proposals were submitted on the eve
of the federal deadline, and at this point the pressure on the local
government was overwhelming. The central planning board was
required by law to conduct a blight investigation of the renewal
area and hold a hearing. Unless it declared the entire area blighted,
the project could not proceed. Legally, then, this agency has signifi-
cant powers. Despite some feeble attempts to exercise these pow-
ers, the planning board was forced to convert its blight hearings
into simply an opportunity for the opposition to "sound off"; the
blight investigation became a ritual.
The efforts of the city council-the supreme legislative unit of
the local government whose approval is needed for all projects-
were equally feeble. By the time a project was presented to them,
it was "frozen" and the councilmen were faced with a take-it-or-
leave-it decision. "As members of the Council and . . . [the Cen-
tral Planning Board] have said, effective local review of clearance
proposals can occur only at the very outset of a proposal. '130 By the
time a proposal was presented to these two units of government,
"the time, energy, and money already expended precluded serious
local review." 31
The success3 2 of the NHA was attributable to its highly skilled
professional staff. The staff was the effective decision maker. It
had the monopoly of political and planning skills and accordingly
it, and not any other group in Newark-governmental or other-
wise-made the major urban redevelopment decisions. The board
of housing authority commissioners, which is the governing body
of the NHA, was reduced by the skill of the NHA to praising the
executive director and approving the projects. Kaplan reports
that since 1948 there had never been a single instance when the
board modified or rejected a staff proposal. The political skill of
the professional staff enabled it to enlist commitments but resist
disclosure of the detailed plans until outright and complete ap-
proval by the two most important governmental units became a
foregone conclusion. Both the city council and the city planning
officials lacked a professional staff, had no tradition of over-all
planning, and were unable to resist the pressures for the immedi-
30 Id. at 33-34.
31 Ibid.
82 "Success" as used in Kaplan's study and throughout this article is in
the limited sense that the initiators of the renewal project accomplish their
objectives.
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ate influx of federal funds. Citizen and semipublic groups were in
much the same position. From time to time the NHA had to make
minor adjustments for local groups (including the city govern-
ment), but never on major substantive issues. Active public sup-
port for the major decisions of the NHA was unnecessary.
In urban renewal the major inputs come from outside the
local system, that is, from the federal government and the
private redevelopers. The active cooperation of only a few
public officials is absolutely essential to the success of a
clearance project. All that NHA requires of other local
groups is their nonintervention. Widespread participation
in slum clearance politics, far from being necessary, often
proves disastrous. 33
In Newark, as distinguished from Center City, the projects were
public projects performing specific public functions. Thus the deci-
sion-making agency, from an over-all point of view, had to tailor the
program to public sentiment. But this restraint, if it really ex-
isted at all, was only of the most vague or general type. The rep-
resentative organs of government, as well as citizens groups, were
regarded not as consultants or participants-instruments by which
the public interest could be asserted meaningfully-but as one of a
series of hurdles (and by no means the most formidable) in the
path of the project. The far-reaching decisions affecting the com-
munity at large were made bureaucratically or managerially by the
agency. The bureaucrats were the planning professionals and the
political professionals. When they chose to present a project to
the public, neither the local government nor interested citizen
groups either had the political or planning expertise to question
the action. As provided by law, the city council had to approve
each project, but by the time the project was submitted to the rep-
resentatives of the people, the basic decisions had been made.
Governmental approval was ritualistic only. On occasion, when
public hearings were held, the main purpose was to let irate groups
"sound off."'3 4
In Center City, the urban redevelopment was privately financed
for private purposes. Nevertheless, there were significant similari-
ties in the decision-making process. As pointed out, the project
significantly affected the community and tangible governmental
support was needed. Yet neither the local government nor the
citizens were able to effectively question the project. Even the
33 Id. at 174.
.34 Similar distortion of the public procedures was practiced with regard
to the selection of the redevelopers. Instead of receiving public bids for
sites already selected to be cleared, the NHA would first negotiate with a
redeveloper. After the project was approved, the NHA would advertise for
bids and sell the site to the only bidder. The federal officials could not offi-
cially approve this practice of selecting redevelopers before site selection,
but they went along. Id. at 24, 26.
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group most seriously threatened, the Main Street merchants, ac-
quiesced or were neutralized. The reason for the ease of accept-
ance in Center City took a different form than that in Newark but
in substance it was the same. The promoters in Center City were
the only group in the community that had both the professional
planning skill and the political skill. In Newark, it was the renewal
agency. In both cities those with the expertise decided not only
the technical aspects of the projects but the substantive policy
issues as well. In both cities "the time, energy, and money already
expended precluded serious local review." In Newark, the decision
maker was a public agency operating independently of the demo-
cratic process. In Center City, it was a private group of promoters.
The common denominator was a monopoly of the planning and
political skills. In both cities, the groups which lacked these skills,
including the local governments, also lacked the ability to remake
the decisions.
B. New Haven, Connecticut
The urban redevelopment program of New Haven was also highly
successful-the initators of the redevelopment programs were able
to accomplish their objectives. 5 The decision makers in New Ha-
ven, however, were not an independent public agency; they were
the mayor and his professional staff. This was the group that
monopolized the political and planning skills.
In Center City the proponents of the redevelopment project
achieved legitimacy (and the required legislation) through the
local legislature; they were able to obtain the unanimous endorse-
ment of the council and they used this endorsement to stifle in-
cipient criticism. The mayor of New Haven had a different prob-
lem. His large majority in the board of aldermen assured him of
the formal legal approval and legislation, but in the partisan poli-
tics of New Haven it would not give him the aura of community
approval needed to accomplish long-term revolutionary changes.
He, in effect, created another community body that would serve this
legitimizing function-the Citizens Action Commission. The com-
mission itself numbered twenty-five and included bankers (one of
whom was also the president of the local chamber of commerce),
the president of Yale and the dean of its law school, the leader of
the Democratic Party, prominent labor leaders, leading manufac-
turers and other business leaders, religious leaders, and persons
prominent in reform activities. In the mayor's words: "We've got
the biggest muscles, the biggest set of muscles in New Haven on
the top C.A.C."3 The CAC also had six special committees which
in turn had nearly thirty subcommittees. The total membership
was over 400. These committees and subcommittees were special-
35 Decision making in the New Haven program is analyzed in DAHL,
WHO GovERNs? ch. 10 (1961), and POLSBY, op. cit. supra note 27, ch. 4.36 DAHL, WHO GovERas? 130 (1961).
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ized (e.g., industrial and harbor development; central business
district; housing; health, welfare, and recreation; human relations)
and included active and prominent businessmen, architects, law-
yers, social workers, clergymen, teachers, educational administra-
tors, and housewives.
The CAC and its committees were ostensibly to provide citizen
participation in urban redevelopment decisions. The proposals
were to be considered and passed upon by the CAC, thus giving the
projects the needed legitimacy and acceptability. In discussing
how this arrangement actually worked, two important aspects of
the CAC must be kept in mind. First, the people in the CAC (par-
ticularly at the top) could not be classified as pliant tools of the
mayor and his group; they were very prominent people, many of
whom would normally oppose the Democratic Party and its mayor.
Second, the subcommittees, at least on paper, gave the CAC its
planning expertise with which it could check independently the
proposals of the mayor and his staff. At least on paper, then, the
mayor and his staff did not have a monopoly of the political and
planning skills.
But the working relations between the mayor and the CAC were,
in essence, no different from the relations between the Center City
promoters and the city council, and the NHA and the legislative
body of the city of Newark. Polsby reports:
The major substantive decisions on urban redevelopment
were made by [the mayor and his staff] . . . . Most of
these decisions were made in secret. As one official said,
the redevelopment program, like a submarine, "surfaced"
only when it was legally or politically necessary to receive
approval from the Board of Aldermen, the Redevelopment
Agency, or the CAC. Our research group was unable to
find a single case where this approval was not forth-
coming.3 7
"Except for a few trivial instances, the 'muscles' never directly
initiated, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought before them by the
Mayor and his Development Administrator. s38 The CAC members
themselves admitted that they never initiated any proposals; and in
fact, they could not even successfully criticize any proposals. The
specialized committees and subcommittees of the CAC rarely met,
and it is doubtful that they possessed the really concrete expertise
needed to question specific proposals. In short, the mayor's special
community body only served the very important function of assur-
ing acceptability of the mayor's program. It was, no doubt, a bril-
liant stroke on the part of the mayor and it "virtually decapitated
the opposition. '39
37 POLSBY, op. cit. supra note 27, at 73.
38 DAL, WHO GovERNs? 131 (1961).
39 Id. at 133.
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The "democracy" of decision making in urban redevelopment in
New Haven is dramatically illustrated by the following episode:
The second phase of urban redevelopment, the Church
Street Project, . . . involved razing a substantial portion
of the city center, in which numerous retail stores were
located. A group of small merchants who were directly
affected objected strenuously to being removed from their
places of business. Some of them were unable to sustain
the loss of good will and improvements and were forced out
of business. This group never attacked the redevelopment
program per se, however; they only objected to its unto-
ward effects on themselves. The city administration at-
tempted to handle these objections by devising palliatives.
It underwrote a 10 per cent reduction on rentals offered by
the redeveloper to all displaced businesses taken into the
new project; it set up a business relocation office which
turned out to be largely ineffectual, but which was de-
signed to assist displaced merchants in finding suitable
space; and, finally, the city aided financially in the con-
struction of temporary housing for displaced businesses on
cleared land in the downtown area.
The small merchants' objections to the redevelopment
program were aired primarily at public hearings. The city
administration always took these public occasions seriously
and generally succeeded in offsetting the testimony of dis-
sidents by producing a tidal wave of support for the pro-
gram in the form of public statements by leaders from all
conceivable segments of the community: business, banking,
real estate, labor, religious and human welfare civic groups,
PTA's, ethnic minorities, and so on.40
In New Haven the mayor and his staff monopolized the political
and planning skills. Potentially conflicting influences were care-
fully kept out of the critical formative stages of the planning.
When legislation (i.e., local approval of the projects) and legiti-
macy were needed, the public participation was ritualistic only.
By the time dissidents were allowed to be heard, it was too late.
The basic decisions were managerial or bureaucratic.
Since the mayor is an elected official, it might be argued that the
New Haven process is significantly more democratic than either
Newark's or Center City's. The validity of this argument, however,
rests on one's conception of democratic decision making. It is true
that none of these programs-Center City, Newark, or New Haven-
would have come into being unless they commanded the broad,
over-all community agreement which is expressed at periodic elec-
tions when the existing political leadership asks to be retained in
office. In Center City and Newark the decision makers had the
co-operation of the mayors; indeed, they were among the key pub-
lic officials needed for the success of the programs. The decision
40 POLSBY, op. cit. supra note 27, at 92-93.
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makers adopt and push programs designed to fit the broad, vague
wishes of the people, and the programs do find agreement with the
electorate.41  But is this what democracy in decision making
means? If so, then why the requirement that the local legislature
approve the individual project sites? Why the requirement that
there be public hearings? The community can express its view at
the next general election. rt seems that at the very least democ-
racy in the decision-making process means that the local legisla-
tures deliberate and decide, after meaningful opportunity to be
heard is granted to the citizenry-the interested and affected per-
sons and groups.42 Public approval, through the action of the lo-
cal legislature and not the polls, is for specific projects and for the
specific allocation and use of urban land; it is not for the over-all
programs of a city administration. This difference in the meaning
of democracy in decision making can make a real difference in the
impact on the interests of minorities. Fifty-one per cent of the
electorate may approve the programs in general, but would not
the majority also have approved the programs even if there was
a change in the boundary of one of the projects to protect a
small group of merchants? It is this type of democracy-the oppor-
tunity of minority interests to be heard-that the legally required
decision-making procedures are designed to secure. And it was this
type of democracy that was subverted in Center City, in Newark,
and by the elected mayor of New Haven. It is no answer to say that
it doesn't matter if the bureaucratic or managerial decision sub-
verted the local legislature because the public subsequently ap-
proved of the decision at the polls.
C. Chicago, Illinois I
Rossi and Dentler, in studying the Hyde Park-Kenwood urban
redevelopment project, were concerned with one central question:
"What did citizens contribute to an urban renewal planning opera-
tion in Hyde Park-Kenwood. ' '43 One of the principal findings was
that
when citizens wished, for whatever reason, to take the op-
portunities presented, they were able to make significant
41 In Center City the incumbents were returned to office in an actively
contested election. The Center Circle project itself was not made a major
issue by the opposition. In part this was because of the generally favora-
ble public reaction to the project, and in part because of the acknowledged
role played by X, who was a well-known member of the opposition party.
In Newark the newly elected mayor campaigned on a platform of more
and better urban redevelopment, but he did not specifically criticize the
NHA. Mayor Lee of New Haven achieved notable political victories as a
result of his urban redevelopment program.
42 This, of course, is a basic tenet of the democratic dogma. For an ex-
amination of this concept as it relates to the realities of big city life, see
Greer, Individual Participation in a Mass Society, in APPROACHES TO THE
STUDY OF POLITICS 329 (Young ed. 1958).
43 Rossi & DENTLER, THE POLITICS OF URBAN RENEWAL 2 (1961).
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gains as measured by their own interests. This conclusion,
based on solid evidence, is a strong negation of the fancies
of those who believe that renewal planning is always a mat-
ter of informal handclasps between hidden hands among
"those who are in power. '44
It would appear, then, that the decision-making process for this
renewal project differed markedly from the ones which we have
previously examined. Do the facts support this conclusion? Was
this democratic decision making in that citizens and interested
groups were given a meaningful opportunity to be heard? If so,
how were the political and planning skills distributed?
The history of this project is very complex, as one would expect a
major civic undertaking in Chicago to be. Even though the Hyde
Park-Kenwood project was public urban renewal, the initiators and
planners were a private group-the South East Chicago Commis-
sion-which was led and staffed primarily by persons from the Uni-
versity of Chicago. The history of that commission has a familiar
ring. The governing board was composed of seventy-five very
prominent people from the site area, but the executive director
and his staff had the real decision-making power. The authors of
the study report: "Most of the Commission Board members, when
interviewed, echoed the view of this businessman who had served
since 1956: 'Most of our actions are rubber stamps. It's mostly be-
cause Julian Levi is such an aggressive, hard-working director.
We haven't voted him down on anything all year.' -45 Like the
CAC, the board lent prestige, legitimacy, and financial backing.
The staff had the energy, the initiative, and the know-how.
The "grass roots" citizens' organization was called the Hyde
Park-Kenwood Conference. In many respects, this organization
differed from other community organizations. Its membership was
very widespread and penetrating. Through its affiliated block or-
ganizations, it was estimated that at least one person in every fifth
household belonged. In addition, it had a paid, full-time profes-
sional staff. Finally, its planning committee commanded a great
wealth of expertise; its members included nationally known fig-
ures in planning, geography, real estate, and public administration.
The committee had long been concerned with comprehensive re-
newal planning for the area.
Rossi and Dentler describe in detail instances in which the con-
ference was able to share in decision making; it was able to modify
plans to take account of the interests of its constituents. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that despite the conference's long interest
in planning, its great expertise, and its connections "downtown," it
could not cope with the problems of day-to-day planning. It re-
viewed the technical features of the plans, it evaluated the propo-
44 Id. at 152.
45 Id. at 75.
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sals, and it served as a conduit of communication between the pro-
ponents and the citizenry. It was aided in its tasks by the complete
accessibility of the South East Chicago Commission's planner.
The important achievement of the Conference did not re-
sult from its direct influence on the Final Plan .... [But]
by keeping alive the issues of interracialism, housing for
low- and middle-income groups, and proper relocation pro-
cedures for displaced residents, the Conference modified
the planning process by introducing considerations of
human needs and wishes. The plan might otherwise have
been totally oriented toward institutional and commercial
uses.
46
The conference, then, had direct access to the early formative
stages of the plans, and it had available to it planning skills with
which to evaluate the proposals. Although it was not able to as-
sume anything like joint responsibility for decisions, it was able
to make known its views effectively and to accomplish change.
Contrast the accomplishments of the conference with the activi-
ties of the Cardinal's Committee on Conservation and Urban Re-
newal, organized by Cardinal Stritch. This was potentially a very
powerful organization (Roman Catholics are the largest single reli-
gious denomination in Chicago) and it came out in opposition to the
Final Plan for Hyde Park-Kenwood. 47 There were many reasons
why this committee was unsuccessful in changing the Final Plan,
but one of the more important reasons was that this group was un-
able to participate in the decision-making process until the final
stages.
[T]he metropolitan groups [i.e., interest groups in the city
but outside of the Hyde Park-Kenwood area] had to wait
until the Final Plan was reviewed by the City Council be-
fore being afforded an opportunity to make public pro-
nouncements. By that stage too much had been invested in
the specific proposals by the planners and the local com-
munity for much serious consideration to be given to met-
ropolitan criticisms.
. . . [At this point in the process,] when criticisms were
voiced, attention switched from the particulars cited to the
imputation of underlying motives and to the ready assump-
tion that anyone who was not "all for" approval was
against conservation. 48
Gaining approval by the city government of Chicago seemed to
present far more difficulties than faced the proponents of the pro-
46 Id. at 155.
47 The potential power of this organization is illustrated by the fact that
final approval by the city council was delayed five months until the poli-
tical leaders could be sure of how much weight the Cardinal's Committee
actually had.
48 Id. at 235-36, 239.
SUMMER]
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
jects in Center City, Newark, and New Haven. In addition to the
Cardinal's Committee, there were other private groups in opposi-
tion. Some were opposed to particular parts of the Hyde Park-
Kenwood plan, and others feared that that project would use up too
much of the available municipal and federal funds. Furthermore,
although Mayor Daley supported the project, he wanted a consen-
sus reached among the fifty-man aldermanic body, rather than
urban renewal by a bare majority.
Approval by the city council was long delayed while the mayor
and the protagonists jockeyed for position. The council's housing
and planning committee conducted extensive hearings and everyone
who wanted to speak was given an opportunity to do so. The au-
thors of the study say that they "must conclude that the decision to
approve urban renewal in Hyde Park was reached in the best tradi-
tion of democratic politics. '49
Does this study, then, qualify our hypothesis? Did the legislative
body share in the decision-making process? It would seem that on
the basis of Rossi and Dentler's own evidence, the council did not.
The lack of provision for middle- and low-income housing in the
project was the basis for the most serious criticisms of it and was
one of the most important things that the majority of the council's
powerful committee on housing and planning wanted. During the
hearings several members of the committee were quick to resent the
idea that the Final Plan could not be changed at this stage of the
process. Here, then, was potential political power and a clear per-
ception of a desired change in the project plan that had support
among other groups (including the cardinal's committee) in the
larger community. The result: "guarantees for public and middle
income housing were not secured as part of the ordinance, nor
were the specifics of site locations for such housing settled within
the committee. Instead the issue was resolved as a matter of trust
between the Council and the administrative units of the city gov-
ernment."50
The reason for this result was that it was in fact too late to change
the Final Plan. When the mayor came out in support of the Plan,
he said: "The difficulty is, that the city council has no power to
amend, but can only reject or approve this. Rejection by the coun-
cil would be not only a blow to the city, but a setback for urban
renewal on a nationwide basis." 51 This was not true as far as the
council's legal powers were concerned. It could have recommended
many changes as conditions of legislative approval. But the plan-
ner for the project, as well as the mayor, pointed out that the in-
troduction of public housing provisions would require a complete
repetition of the decision-making process, including renegotiations
49 Id. at 241.
50 Id. at 274.
51 Id. at 266.
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with Washington. In short, despite the potential political power of
the council and its committee, it was faced with only two alterna-
tives: blanket endorsement (with subsequent negotiations) or re-
jection; and the latter, at this stage of the game, was "too drastic a
step to be seriously considered. '52
What emerges, then, from this episode in urban renewal is a de-
cision-making pattern very similar to the ones previously exam-
ined. The citizens who lived in the site area participated to some
extent in the decision-making process. But this participation did
not make the process for Hyde Park-Kenwood democratic in the
sense in which we have used the term. The citizens who partici-
pated were the project site residents; they did not represent and in
fact opposed various other affected persons and groups in the rest of
the community. Thus only one segment of the public interest
had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It is important to note,
too, that this participation was at the formative stages of the plan-
ning. This, indeed, is the crucial stage, but it is not the participa-
tion called for by the legally prescribed procedures for democratic
decision making. In fact what happened was that the residents of
the project site, as a special interest group, joined forces with the
proponents, and together they presented the Final Plan.53
At this point, democratic decision making was stymied, as was the
case in the other projects. With the mayor supporting the Final
Plan in its major aspects, the council and other interest groups
throughout the city were stuck with a take-it-or-leave-it package.
These groups, including the council, had been kept out of the
formative negotiations; when they were allowed to be heard, it was
too late. The well-conducted, orderly hearings of the legislative
body and its committee were more form than substance. The politi-
cal and planning skills of the initiators of the project and their
citizen allies (who also had these skills) were able to prevent the
other groups from bringing their skills to bear.
D. Chicago, Illinois II
In contrast to the previous case studies, Meyerson and Banfield's
report of the decision-making process regarding public housing in
Chicago presents a picture of failure, in the sense that the initiators
52 Id. at 236.
53 Even here the significance of the decision-making role of the citizen
group is open to question. Writing elsewhere, Rossi comments,
The achievements of the Conference must be judged considerable
but only in some directions .... The lesson of the Conference and
Hyde Park-Kenwood for the student of community organization was
that citizen participation is a co-optation device which progressively
committed the citizens to the plan while their right to dissent was
being undercut.
Mossi , Theory, Research, and Practice in Community Organization, in
DEMOcRACY IN URBAN AMERICA 382, 391 (Williams & Press eds. 1961).
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and proponents of the program did not obtain their objective. 54
While the final decision by the local government was euphemis-
tically termed a "compromise," it was in reality a defeat of the
proposal.
The events took place between 1949 and 1952. The struggle was
over the selection of sites for public housing. The initiator of the
public housing program was the Chicago Housing Authority. The
opponents were the leaders of the fifty-man Chicago City Council.
The selection of sites necessarily reflected decisions about density
of population, problems of relocation, availability of low-cost hous-
ing, and, most crucially, the racial composition of neighborhoods.
At the risk of over-simplification, the CHA was, among other
things, determined not to have public housing increase the ghetto-
ization of Negroes in Chicago. One of the principal aims of the
agency, therefore, was to build a substantial part of the public hous-
ing on vacant land. The leaders of the council, on the other hand,
while they were generally willing to support public housing in
principle, were not willing to do so if it meant upsetting the racial
composition of the neighborhoods. They were opposed to the use of
vacant land because they feared that this would bring Negroes into
their wards.
The story of the struggle between the CHA and the council is long
and intricate. Its outcome depended on a variety of factors, many
of which perhaps serve to make this case study an inappropriate
analogy. For example, this particular struggle was a part of the
over-all struggle for control of the Democratic machine that was
being waged between the leaders of the council (called the "Big
Boys") and Jacob Arvey, who had succeeded former Mayor Kelly as
chairman of the party's County Central Committee. This back-
ground is important in two respects. The CHA had been Kelly's pet
and the council leaders in part viewed their struggle with the CHA
as a struggle with the old Kelly dominance. In addition, Mayor Ken-
nelly, who was in office during the CHA-council fight, was Arvey's
candidate. Kennelly specifically eschewed the role of leader of the
Democratic machine and the council (which serves to distinguish
this situation from those of Newark, New Haven, and Hyde Park-
Kenwood, all of which had strong mayors supporting the pro-
grams). Our inquiry here, however, concerns the strategy and tac-
tics of decision making in urban redevelopment. Even though the
public housing controversy in Chicago contained great differences,
it does shed light, by way of contrast, on the importance and use of
the planning and political skills.
The CHA was formally directed by five unpaid commissioners ap-
pointed by the mayor, but subject to approval by the state housing
board and removable by that board only. The statutes gave the au-
54 MEYERSON & BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(paperback ed. 1964).
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thority very wide-powers including how much public housing would
be built, where it would be built, and whether there should be re-
habilitation instead of new housing. These powers, however, were
not without limits. The Federal government had to approve the
projects. The city also had controls. The statutes required, among
other things, that the CHA loan application to the federal govern-
ment had to be approved by the city and there had to be co-opera-
tive agreements on taxes, services, building codes, and streets.
The most important limitation on the powers of the CHA was the
fact that the city council had to approve the locations planned for
each project. The council was given this power by state statute in
1948. The statute applied only to the CHA and no other Illinois
housing authority. It was enacted by the state legislature at the
urging of the city council. The timing of this law is significant.
Under Mayor Kelly's strong leadership, CHA proposals were never
in trouble with the council. The statute was passed soon after
Kelly retired, and "it was an unmistakable sign that the Council
meant to put an end to the Authority's independence." 55 On the
other hand, project sites could not be selected by the council; it had
only a veto power. The law required that the CHA propose the
sites. The protagonists, then, had a veto power on each other's de-
cisions. If there was to be any public housing in Chicago, there had
to be compromise or capitulation.
The CHA, as the initiator of the projects and with its planning
skills, had two basic strategic choices: it could bring in the leaders
of the opposition (the "Big Boys") during the formative stages of
the planning and attempt to negotiate site selections; or, it could
adopt the strategy which we have seen so far-secret planning, the
public presentation of a take-it-or-leave-it alternative, and attempt
to mobilize irresistable political pressure. The second alternative
would involve an attempt to monopolize both the political and
planning skills.
The CHA consciously and deliberately chose the second alterna-
tive. The executive director of the CHA persuaded the commission-
ers that the aldermen would harm the program if they were brought
into the planning stages. The CHA was unable to gain the
support of the mayor, but nevertheless presented the com-
pleted plan to the council and then attempted to bring pressure on
the council to act quickly. The CHA stressed the time factor and
used pressure groups and newspaper publicity. The strategy failed.
The council was very hostile to the take-it-or-leave-it tactic and was
unimpressed by the arguments calling for speedy action. They
were also unimpressed by the political strength of the CHA and its
allies. It was quite clear that the authority failed to monopolize
the political skills necessary to get the program through.
55 Id. at 87.
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On the other hand, there was pressure for public housing, and
the council had to come up with alternative site recommenda-
tions. The story of this development is particularly instructive.
The first attempt of the council was a naked display of political
power. A specially appointed council subcommittee, together with
newspapermen and others, took a bus trip through Chicago to pre-
selected sites. The selection process was unabashedly political.
Practically all of the aldermen on the subcommittee were hostile to
public housing. They were out to embarrass the aldermen who
supported the CHA and to select sites which would obviously be re-
jected by the CHA. The sites recommended were ridiculous to all.
It then became clear to the leaders of the council that if they
were to win this fight, their sites had to be selected by agencies
with technical competence. Planning skills were needed in addi-
tion to political skills. The leaders of the Council then selected
sites seriously. But this time they had the use and support of the
city plan commission. And they retained the services of a techni-
cal expert-Ralph H. Burke. Burke performed the vital function
of preparing an elaborate professional justification of the leaders'
plan, as well as countering the CHA's technical objections to it. In
addition, he represented the council when the dispute moved to
Washington. The end result of this was that the CHA accepted the
council's recommendations.
The CHA did not succeed in monopolizing either the planning
skills or the political skills. The council had more than its share of
political skills, but this was not enough. The council could not rely
on the use of political power alone, as the bus trip fiasco demon-
strated. If it was going to win its battle with the CHA, it had to
acquire planning skills. It was able to do this by gaining the sup-
port of the plan commission and the services of Burke. At this
point the council's plan, even though it was a series of political
choices, had the symbols of expertise. The tide then began to
turn away from the CHA, and the political decisions became hidden
in the boring public debate of the technicians.5 6
CONCLUSION
We have examined the decision-making process in five urban
redevelopment efforts. The proponents were independent govern-
ment agencies in two of the cases: Newark and the Chicago public
housing case. In New Haven the proponents were the mayor and
his staff. In Hyde Park-Kenwood they were first a private group
and then an alliance with the site residents. In Center City they
were a private group.
All five efforts required the participation of the local legislative
56 For additional case studies of the decision-making process in metro-
politan government, Chicago-style, see BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE
(1961).
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unit of government in the decision-making process. This partici-
pation is required by law and is designed to inject democratic val-
ues and some measure of disinterested planning expertise into the
decision. In four of these efforts (all except public housing in
Chicago), the participation of the local legislature, as well as
other groups in the community, was ritualistic and formal rather
than genuine. By the time the projects were made "public," seri-
ous debate and decision making had been foreclosed. In these four
efforts, the proponents of the projects were able to monopolize the
available political and planning skills. The imbalance of power
enabled the proponents to manipulate the publicly required pro-
cedures. The law was followed-it had to be if tangible public
support was to be forthcoming-but the purposes and goals of the
law were subverted. This was true regardless of whether the pro-
moters were private groups, independent government agencies, or
elected executive officials. The locus of actual power rested on
those able to command the two skills, and regardless of who ac-
tually wielded the power the decisions were managerial or bu-
reaucratic, not democratic.57
The public housing controversy in Chicago reflects a different
pattern. The proponents there were not able to acquire a monopoly
of skills and they were defeated by the local legislature. In this
controversy the local legislature prevailed, but it could do so only
after it acquired planning skills to accompany its political skills.
But was decision making there more democratic? Given the con-
trol of the Chicago City Council by the "Big Boys," one could argue
that this was another form of managerial decision making, another
example of "in-group" dictation. Meyerson and Banfield, however,
argue that the council leaders were in fact more responsive to what
they (the leaders) considered to be a wider set of community in-
terests. They grant that the leaders of the council were primarily
interested in doing what would be best for the Democratic Party
machine, but they argue that the politicians were not necessarily
wrong in their belief that what was best for the party was also
best for the city as a whole:
[T]here was an important element of truth in the politi-
cians' belief that what was good for the party was in the
public interest. The party was a mechanism through
which a vast number of more or less conflicting interests
57 In their study Meyerson and Banfield compare the Chicago experi-
ence with that of New York City. They describe a decision-making pro-
cess quite similar to the pattern we have seen in each of the successful
programs studied: managerial or bureaucratic decision making by those
who had a monopoly in the combination of political and planning skills(Robert Moses in New York); and low-visibility decision making until the
take-it-or-leave-it package was complete. "Ordinarily in New York it is
possible to protest the location of a public housing project only after the
decision has been virtually made." MEYERSON & BANFIELD, op. cit. supra
note 54, at 296.
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arrived at terms on which they could work together, and
over the long run the party could not survive and prosper if
it deeply offended any large sector of its public. The Dem-
ocratic machine, for example, could not survive if it out-
raged the Negroes or the whites in the conservation areas.
The survival and prosperity of the machine depended up-
on its ability to find settlements which both sides would
agree represented the public interest or something ap-
proaching it.58
We need not decide whether the public housing decision-making
process was more democratic or not. The point is that on the basis
of these five experiences, it seems reasonably clear that the realiza-
tion of any of the democratic values incorporated in the procedural
requirements of public law were fortuitous. The extent to which
these values are reflected in the decision-making process will de-
pend on the lineup of economic and political forces outside of the
legal system. This seems particularly true of the goal of disinter-
ested planning. In all of the situations discussed, including the
public housing of Chicago, the planning experts were sought and
used as tactical support for the political decisions. The governmen-
tal planning units were distressingly ineffective in performing the
role envisaged by the law.59 Planning was essential to achieve the
redevelopment goals, but it was strictly partisan.60
The failure to achieve democratic values in the decision-making
58 Id. at 299-300. In the same vein, see BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE
327 (1961):
And yet, despite the presumptions of common sense, it may be that
under certain circumstances the competition of forces which do not
aim at a common interest produces outcomes which are more "work-
able," "satisfactory," or "efficient" than any that could be contrived
by a central decision-maker consciously searching for solutions in
the common interest.
For an extended discussion of the point, see SCHUBERT, TiE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1960).
59 On the function of a planning commission (or planning agency) in
providing an opportunity for the citizen to be heard, and the suggestion
that, in addition to formal hearings at an advanced stage, mandatory con-
sultation and the occasion for discussion of competing planning proposals
at an earlier stage might be required, see HAAR, LAW AND LAND 75-78
(1964).
00 The government planning unit played an important role only in the
Chicago public housing controversy. Meyerson and Banfield point out the
partisan nature of this use of expertise:
The Plan Commission's responsiveness to City Hall was not sur-
prising. Its budget was precarious and therefore it felt it necessary
to do routine tasks and favors for particular aldermen .... With-
out an analysis by its staff, the Plan Commission reclassified an area
from "blighted" to "conservation," a change which meant that the
area could no longer be considered for slum clearance. Hitherto,
the existence of blight had been a technical matter to be determined
objectively by analyzing the number of structurally sound and un-
sound buildings, the number without running water, and so on. Now
the technical criteria were replaced by political ones.
MEYERSON & BANFIELD, op. cit. supra note 54, at 201.
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process is particularly dramatic in view of the nature of the legally
required procedures. These procedures, it must be re-emphasized,
give the local legislature great powers. The procedures must be
followed; otherwise it is impossible to acquire the necessary public
support. Yet in four of the situations the procedures, with the
potential risks to the promoters, turned out to be just another rela-
tively minor hurdle. In the Chicago public housing controversy
the use of the procedures came about because of a local political
struggle. In all of the situations the realistic use or lack of use of
the legally established procedures depended on events outside of
the legal system.
